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Abstract 
Vladimir Putin’s accession to power after 2000s not just brought new era to the 
Russian Federation but also provided new bounds for the EU-Russian relations. 
By solving the problems of internal instability and changing its political 
trajectory, President Putin restored state prestige and Russia returned to world 
politics with immense ambitions not being just an energy superpower. Not 
surprisingly normative discussions became an important part of the EU-Russian 
relations. This thesis proposes to discuss the European Union and the Russian 
Federation as Normative Powers in the region apart from existing energy 
relations. Admittedly, in case of energy the Russian Federation is considered one 
of the normative powers of the world politics. The core of the current strategy of 
Vladimir Putin is understood as Moscow seems to be ready to offer an alternative 
reading of a set of norms constituting their relations. 
During this study qualitative research and its appropriate methods were 
utilized. Three pioneering scholars were interviewed and for exploring Russian 
normativisim in trans-border cooperation the Northern Dimensions Initiative was 
selected as the single case. New institutionalism as a theoretical lens provided 
foundation to examine the current normative contention. 
Subsequently, under Putin's governance Russia has moved away from being a 
‘norms-taker’ to being a ‘norms-maker’ and accordingly has become very 
normative offensive in cooperation with the European Union. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Background 
 
The relationships between the Russian Federation (RF) and the European Union 
(EU) have been an actual topic over years and prominent scholars devoted 
numerous papers to the topic approaching to these relations in different terms, 
such as competition and partnership (Gomer and Timminis, 2009), confrontation 
and alliance (Karaganov and Yurgens, 2009) or conflict and cooperation 
(Prozorov, 2006). The central objective of the thesis is to investigate the Russian-
European relations, in the context of the institutional structure of relations and 
mainly to discuss parties in the scope of normative power. A basic assumption is 
that fall of the Soviets and establishment of Russian Federation within ‘the values 
of Soviets’, caused disaggregation between sides. Within evolved relationships, as 
mentioned by Gomer and Timminis, there are three modes of cooperation between 
Russia and Europe: strategic, normative and pragmatic. The strategic mode refers 
to fundamental agreements between Russia and Europe where addressed to 
common agenda and the normative mode of cooperation the shared set of norms 
and values underpinning the relationships are implied. Finally, the pragmatic 
mode suggests cooperation being conducted in a short-term and with relevance, 
‘tactical calculations’ (2009, p. XXV). 
The Russian Federation and the European Union are close partners in all 
major fields, including economy, security (internal and external) and energy 
sector. Furthermore, cooperation also covers foreign policy and crucial security 
issues, mainly combating against illegal migration, organized crime and terrorism. 
In other words, in his Diplomatic Yearbook Sergey Lavrov, the current Foreign 
Affairs Minister of RF pointed out that, “Being the largest geopolitical entities on 
the European continent, Russia and the EU are interdependent in many spheres, 
linked by their common civilization roots, culture, history, and future. The agenda 
of our interaction is multidimensional and covers various sectors. We are willing 
to enhance it – on the basis, of course of equality and mutual benefit” (Russian 
Federation Diplomatic Yearbook1 2010). 
The roots of the official relations between Russia and the European Union go 
to over 20 years ago when on 18 December 1989 the very first document was 
signed. The document that referred to regulating economic relation between the 
EU and the USSR (later Russian Federation) titled as Agreement on Trade and 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union, Russia-EU relations, available at 
“http://www.russianmission.eu/en/brief-overview-relations”, date of access: 11/02/2012 
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Commercial and Economic Cooperation. It was the principal historical agreement 
that was considered as the main grounding for cooperation establishment. Four 
and a half years later, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) was 
signed (24 June 1994). It was a major document providing an enhance 
cooperation in political, trade and economic spheres as well as the in legal and 
humanitarian areas. This agreement was a significant step forward for establishing 
a solid cooperation. Next step in the development of relations was at the summit 
in St. Petersburg (May 2003) where sides agreed on the concept of four Common 
spaces: a Common Economic Space, a Common Space of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, a Common Space of External Security and a Common Space of Research 
and Education, including Cultural Aspects. The implementation programme to 
Common Spaces conception was adopted in Moscow summit (May 2005) and 
was titled as ‘Road Maps’. Later in London summit (October 2005), Russia and 
the EU stated on changes necessity in the legal foundation of the four Common 
Space concept and in Sochi Summit (May 2006) sides reached a political 
agreement and started work on the new basic document, aimed for establishment 
of new and more effective mechanisms for the implementation to Common Space. 
Russia is one of the main partners of the European Union (EU) and has more 
agreements with the Union than with any other multilateral entity as from the 
perspective of Stephen White and Margot Light, “the intensity of contacts 
between Russia and the EU is greater than the regular contacts Russia has with 
any other organization” (White and Light 2009, p. 41). After the US and China, 
the recent year statistics analysis shows that the Russian Federation became the 
third trade partner of the EU. Figures (Eurostat) for the annual turnover between 
Russia and the EU member states for 2000-2008 exceeds 200bn Euros. It’s 
important to note that though dropping after finical crisis in the Europe, figures 
are currently growing rapidly. The European Union is of the main importer of 
energy resources and following dependency making Russia the biggest supplier of 
natural gas. 
Since end of the Cold War, the scope of relations defined as strategic 
partnership. The very first official treaty between the European Union and the 
Russian Federation signed in 1995, titled the ‘Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA)’. Since 1990s, the European Union has concluded ten 
partnership and cooperation agreements with Russia, countries of Eastern Europe, 
the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia (Council and Commission Decisions on 
the conclusion of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 99/602/EC; 
99/614/EC; 99/515/EC; 99/490/EC; 99/491/EC; 98/401/EC; 97/800/EC; 
98/149/EC; 99/593/EC; 2009/989/EC). The aims of these partnerships are, “to 
provide a suitable framework for political dialogue, to support the efforts made by 
the countries to strengthen their democracies and develop their economies, 
accompany their transition to a market economy and encourage trade and 
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investment2”. The partnerships are also cover legislative, economic, social, 
financial, scientific, civil, technological and cultural fields (ibid). The PCA plays 
an essential role in the creation of the necessary conditions for the establishment 
of a free trade area with Russia. According to Prozorov, starting from that period, 
“…strategic partnership became a staple phrase of the official discourse of EU–
Russian relations…” (2006, p. 3). The Union’s paper on Common Strategy with 
Russia has clear draws attentions several strategic goals for relationship, described 
as following: 
“Maintaining European stability, promoting global security and responding to the common 
challenges of the continent through intensified cooperation with Russia. The Union remains 
firmly committed to working with Russia, at federal, regional and local levels, to support a 
successful political and economic transformation in Russia. The Union and its Member 
States offer to share with Russia their various experiences in building modern political, 
economic, social and administrative structures, fully recognising that the main 
responsibility for Russia's future lies with Russia itself. The European Council therefore 
adopts this Common Strategy to strengthen the strategic partnership between the Union and 
Russia at the dawn of a new century. The European Council recognises that the future of 
Russia is an essential element in the future of the continent and constitutes a strategic 
interest for the European Union. The offer of a reinforced relationship, based on shared 
democratic values, will help Russia to assert its European identity and bring new 
opportunities to all the peoples of the continent. The enlargement of the Union will further 
increase these benefits and opportunities” (1999/414/CFSP, 4 June 1999).  
As regards to the Union’s other documents such as Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament on relations with 
Russia, solid relations with Russia are also indicated as: 
“Russia is an important partner, with which there is considerable interest to engage and 
build a genuine strategic partnership on the basis of positive interdependence. Russia is our 
largest neighbour, brought even closer to the EU by enlargement” (COM/2004/0106 final).  
The solid and closer relations also have been indicated in several Russian 
official documents such as Russia’s Midterm Strategy towards the EU where it’s 
identified as “the strategy is aimed at the development and strengthening of 
strategic partnership between Russia and the EU in world affairs and prevention 
and settlement, through common efforts, of local conflicts in Europe with an 
emphasis on the supremacy of international law and non-use of force. It provides 
for the construction of a united Europe without dividing lines and the interrelated 
and balanced strengthening of the positions of Russia and the EU within the 
international community of the 21st century” (Prozorov 2006, p. 3). 
The problematic aspect originated in this kind of close partnership brings up 
the necessity for amity or enmity discussions. The discussions provide specific 
approach entitled as “value gap” between sides, or as Gomer and Timminis put it 
forward, “…[a] value gap between Russia and the West was perceived to be 
widening with the latter facing a difficult challenge of balancing values against 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2 EU External relations, Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) available at 
“http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations/relations_with_third_countries/eastern_europe_and_c
entral_asia/r17002_en.htm”, date of access: 12/02/2012 
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interests in the pursuit of a strategic partnership with Russian Administration.” 
(2009, p. XX). After elections in Russia (2000), Vladimir Putin accessed to the 
power and implemented reforms and shift of political orientation that especially 
caused deterioration in the current relationships and the number of the 
problematic issues has retarded progress in relations. 
1.1.1 Research Purpose and Scope  
This thesis proposes to discuss the European Union and the Russian Federation as 
Normative Powers in the region. On the other hand, the ultimate goal of the paper 
is to analyze Foreign Policy Concepts of the Russian Federation that were ratified 
under Vladmir Putin’s presidency and titled by scholars (Sakwa, 2009; 
Makarychev, 2008) as, “Russia towards New Realism” or “Normative Offensive”. 
In other words, this study concentrates on defining Russia as Normative power, 
apart from existing energy relations between sides. Most pioneering and 
considerable scholars have argued over the decades on relations between 
European Union and Russia indicating the inevitability of divergences or 
competition between sides (Kanet, 2010; Haas, 2010; Haukkala, 2007, 2008a, 
2008b, 2009; Averre, 2009; Medvedev, 2008). As mentioned above, this study 
neglects energy relations between sides. Undoubtedly, the Russian Federation is 
(considered) a normative power that found its justification in the papers of 
considerable scholars of Russian or European studies (Romanova, 2011; Averre, 
2009; Hopf, 2008). Normative power a as term acquired popularity during the last 
two decades and in international arena the United States and the European Union 
are considered normative powers because of their ability to establish normative 
principles and to apply them to different realities. Russian Federation also started 
playing an important role in the region since Vladimir Putin’s presidency (2000). 
Trajectory of state political system has been changed and Russia became a 
‘normative offensive’.    
1.1.2 Thesis Outline 
This paper consists of the following chapters. Chapter 2 gives an overview of 
global governance and conceptualization of power as well as defining of the 
notion of normative power. Chapter 3 covers the understanding of institutional 
relations, in that stance institutionalism is discussed and indicated as a theoretical 
framework of this study. Chapter 4 covers the utilized research methods, includes 
data collection and operationalization of research. Chapter 5 reveals the 
discussion of the Europe Normative Power, includes concept, framework, norms 
spreading mechanism and limitations. Finally, Chapter 6 examines Foreign and 
Domestic Policy Reforms of Russian Federation since 2000 particularly, provides 
elements of New Realism, profoundly approaches to reforms of Foreign Policy 
Concepts (2000 and 2007) followed by discussion of Russia as a Normative 
Power together with specifying the Northern Dimension initiative to examine 
Russia as a Normative Power. 
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2 Global Governance 
2.1 Typology of Power 
Russian Federation together with the European-Union are the major players in the 
region for formulating agenda of the global governance.  In following chapter 
author shed light on the discussions of the global governance and as well as by 
exploring power typology is considered one of the main foundations for the 
conceptualization of the normative power per se. As proposed by Barnnett and 
Duvall, “the intensifying connections between states and peoples, better known as 
globalization, are now frequently presumed to create the need for governance and 
rule-making at the global level” (2005, p. 1). Mentioned statement determines the 
fact that global governance existence provides main grounding to states and 
people for cooperating in different fields such as, economic, political, 
environmental and security matters and cooperation to be realized in the scope of 
common interests and values. Absence of global governance can provoke several 
dilemmatic situations, “global governance then is thought to bring out the best in 
the international community and rescue from its worst instincts” (ibid). 
Governance and power are interrelated notions where, “governance involves the 
rules, structures, and institutions that guide, regulate, and control social life, 
features that are fundamental elements of power” (ibid, p. 2). Analysis of power, 
“…must include a consideration of the normative structure and discourses that 
generate different social capacities for actor to define and pursue their interests 
and ideals” (ibid, p. 3).  
Most of international relations researchers refer to framework of realism for 
defining and discussing power and mostly stand on the well-known definition by 
Robert Dahl where he indicates that relations between actors in which A has the 
ability to make ‘B do something that B would not otherwise do’ (1957, pp. 202-
3). In other words, power refers to “one state’s capability to use its material 
resources to ensure the compliance of other states” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, p. 
40). According to Scott’s power as a general term is “the production, in and 
through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine 
their own circumstances and fate” (2001, pp. 1-2). The notion of the power 
defined from different perspectives after review of researches in international 
studies. Lukes pointed out three aspects of the power. Initially, power is a concept 
which is primitive in that it cannot be defined by making reference to 
uncontroversial concepts. Secondly, it is essentially contested and always linked 
to individual positions and assumptions. Thirdly, power is performative - 
conceptions of power influence our thinking and actions in general (Lukes 2005, 
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p. 477). According to him “having power is being able to make or to receive any 
change, or to resist it” (ibid, p.  478).  
Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall have developed the conceptualization 
of power and divided it into four forms (typology) and included two mechanisms 
(2005, pp. 3-4). Compulsory power refers “to relations of interaction that allows 
one actor to have direct control over another” (ibid). In other words, powerful 
state threatens another and forced to change its policies. Institutional power 
defined as “…when actors exercise indirect control over others, such as when 
states design international institutions in ways that work to their long-term 
advantage and to the disadvantage of others” (ibid). Structural power was 
indicated as next fold and defined as “concerns the constitution of social 
capacities and interests of actors in direct relation to one another” (ibid). As to 
Barnett and Duvall (2005), “this form of power is the workings of the capitalist 
world-economy in producing social positions of capital and labor with their 
respective differential abilities to alter their circumstances and fortunes”. Finally, 
Productive power defined as, “the socially diffuse production of subjectivity in 
systems of meaning and signification” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, p. 3). The 
mechanism which in they included, firstly refers to “how power works, either 
through interaction or through constitution”, and secondly, “how the social 
relations of power are specified, as direct or diffuse” (ibid, pp. 11-14).  
 
Table 1. Types of Power (Barnett and Duvall 2005, p. 12) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Understanding the notion of power is very essential to this study, especially 
for defining normative power notions based in that typology. In a nutshell, I’m 
willing to shed light on the above mentioned typology of power in diverse 
perspective. What is compulsory power? Does an international organization 
possibly act as compulsory power? Firstly, compulsory power is a good example 
of the realist concept focusing on the relations between states or actor and where 
one of them is able to directly influence actions of the other. It is significant to 
mention Max Weber’s famous definition of power where he defines it as 
“probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to 
carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this 
probability exists” (Weber 1947, p. 52). Sheer influence was explored by several 
scholars in this field. One of the main works here was done by Robert Dahl, who 
gives main concept and definition of power from realist perspective, as indicated 
above. The concept of Dahl is based on the following three defining features: 
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“First, there is intentionality on the part of Actor A. What counts is that A wants B to alter 
its actions in a particular direction. If B alters its actions under the mistaken impression that 
A wants it to, then that would not count as power because it was not A’s intent that B do so. 
Second, there must be a conflict of desires to the extent that B now feels compelled to alter 
its behavior. A and B want different outcomes and B loses. Third, A is successful because it 
has material and ideational resources at its disposal that lead B to alter its actions” (Barnett 
and Duvall 2005, pp. 13-14). 
The Dahl’s concept provided three essential outputs (intentionality, conflict, 
resources) whether Barnett and Duvall determined, “…the relevant resources 
being an intrinsic property of actors or are better understood as a part of 
dependence relationship between two or more actors, the underlying claim is that 
identifiable resources that are controlled and intentionally deployed by actors are 
what counts in thinking about power” (2005, pp. 13-14). They pointed out that, 
compulsory power also exists “whenever A’s actions control B’s actions or 
circumstances, even if unintentionally” (ibid). As it also shown in the statement of 
Bachrach and Baratz, “...power still exists even when those who dominate are not 
conscious of how their actions are producing unintended effects” (1962, p. 952).  
On one hand, the compulsory powers are playing an essential role in global 
governance. As Gilpin revealed, “states, and especially the great powers, are able 
to determine the content and direction of global governance by using their 
decisive material advantages not only to determine what are the areas to be 
governed but also to directly ‘coordinate’ the actions of lesser powers so that they 
align with their interests” (Gilpin, 2002). On the other hand, besides that states or 
great powers, multinational corporations have an important role in world politics. 
Barnett and Duvall indicated that, “multinational corporations can use their 
control over capital to shape the foreign economic policies of small states and 
global economic policies” (2005, p. 14). In other words, “[an] international 
organizations is also exhibiting compulsory power” (ibid). As sum, the 
compulsory power is not limited to material resources but also as shown by 
Barnnet and Duvall, “[it] includes symbolic and normative resources” (ibid). As 
an example, we could take Keck and Sikkink (1998) indicating, “transnational 
activists, civil society organizations, and international nongovernmental 
organizations have demonstrated the ability to use rhetorical and symbolic tools, 
and shaming tactics, to get specific targeted states, multinational corporations, and 
others to comply with the values and norms that they advance” (ibid,  p. 15). 
Unlike the compulsory power, institutional power is trying to control actors in 
indirect ways, as determined by Barnnet and Duvall “formal and informal 
institutions that mediate between A and B, as A, working through the rules and 
procedures that define those institutions, guides, steers, and constrains the actions 
(or non-actions) and conditions of existence of others, sometimes even 
unknowingly” (2005, p. 15). Also authors’ evaluation and comparison on 
compulsory and institutional power shed light on the following different aspects 
of these typologies: 
“Firstly, compulsory power is based on resources whereas A to exercise power directly 
over B, A cannot necessarily be said to “possess” the institution that constrains and shapes 
B. Secondly, the recognition of institutional arrangements whereas indicates that A and B 
are socially removed from– only indirectly related to – one another. Thirdly, institutional 
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power considers the decisions that were not made because of institutional arrangements 
which are the limit possible opportunities or some biases; it is particularly of collective 
action (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; 1975)” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, pp. 15-16). 
For finalizing typology of the power discussion, in a nutshell, I will try to 
bring clarity on structural and productive powers as well. Main concern of the 
structural power is to determine social capacities and interests, in perspective of 
Barnett and Duvall who highlighted that, “structural power concerns the structures 
– or, more precisely, the constitutive, internal relations of structural positions – 
that define what kinds of social beings actors are” (2005, p. 18). Several scholars 
researched international relations and explored structural power in their analyses 
(Rupert and Smith, 2002; Murphy, 1994; Cox, 1992; Latham, 1999) and several 
of them specified structural power as ‘conceive structure as an internal relation’, 
where it refers, ‘A exists only by virtue of its relation to structural position B’ 
(Bhaskar, 1979; Isaac, 1987). 
In several respects productive and structural powers coincide because they are 
not controlled by specific actors or in other words, as pointed by Barnett and 
Duvall (2005) “both are attentive to constitutive social processes that are” (p. 18).  
Both sides also indicate the processes of social capacities of actors are socially 
produced, and how a current process alters actors’ self-understandings and 
perceived interests (ibid). Only productive power differs from structural power in 
its subjectivity approach, because, “structural power concerns the constitution of 
subjects, it typically envisions hierarchical and binary relations of domination that 
work to the advantage of those structurally empowered to the disadvantage of the 
socially weak” (ibid). There are two important features for distinguishing 
productive power and structural power. As Barnett and Duvall (2005) argued that 
productive power “…related to discursive processes in which meaning is 
produced, fixed, lived, experienced, and transformed and from other perspective” 
and “productive power concerns the boundaries of all social identities and 
considers all social subjects to be equal individuals whose relationships are 
constituted by changing understandings, meanings, norms, customs, and social 
identities” (p. 55). 
Consequently, by indicating the multidimensional nature of power, they 
provided us more clarity to better understanding of the notion of normative power, 
where the dimension of power often associated with the EU (Barnett and Duvall 
2005). 
2.2 Conceptualization of Normative Power 
The term normative power was introduced to the EU literature by Francois 
Duchene who was the key adviser to Jean Monnet. Ian Manners is considered one 
of the pioneering scholars in this field who devoted one of his papers to normative 
ethics of the European Union in 2002. Before I commence discussing Manners’ 
studies on normative power, it is mandatory a review of other most prominent 
scholars on the concept of Normative Power as an alternative approach in the 
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subsequent lines. Starting from the last two decades various international relation 
scholars defined this notion from different perspectives. In political literature 
several definitions and concepts of normative power have been identified by 
scholars. I will try to shed light on mostly three considerable perspectives of EU 
and Russian studies scholars and will try to finalize it with Manners’ five point 
perspectives on concept of normative power.   
Derek Averre is one of the pioneering scholars of the Russian studies who 
mostly focused on EU-Russian relations in his papers, defining the concept as, 
“essentially, the power and capacity of a state to shape norms which are accepted 
by a critical mass of state and non-state actors in the international or regional 
system over a long duration of time” (Interview 1). Tatiana Romanova, 
specialized on Russian studies and she defined the concepts as, “the power which 
able to define norms basically, the power which able to define what is good and 
what is bad” (Interview 2). In other words, she analyzed and determined that 
normative power can also be defined as power that sets norms. Sergei Prozorov 
approach on normative power almost coincides with Manners’ (2009) 
conceptualization perspective. Besides he indicates that, “aside from the caveat 
that normative power remains power and is irreducible to looser categories such 
as authority or influence” (Interview 3).   
In recent years, the discussion within the concept of normative power became 
much debated, Ian Manners (2009) provided elements of Concept of Normative 
Power in world politics (the concept mostly refers to the European Union, but 
surely can be used as a measure for other cases as well). His conceptualization of 
normative power consists of the following elements: being ideational; involving 
principles, actions, and impact; as well as having broader consequences in world 
politics. 
Being ideational, as he mentioned “normative power, in its ideal or purest 
form, is ideational rather than material or physical”, and analyzed that, “[it 
should] involves normative justification rather than the use of material incentives 
or physical force” (Manners 2009, p. 2) It is obvious that normative justification 
implies various timescale and form of engagement politics. Second argumentation 
is involving principles, as ideational non-material justification involves three part 
understanding, ‘linking principles, actions, and impact’ (ibid). Manners indicated 
‘normative power should primarily be seen as legitimate in the principles being 
promoted’, and explained as ‘if normative justification is to be convincing or 
attractive, then the principles being promoted must be seen as legitimate, as well 
as being promoted in a coherent and consistent way’ (ibid). By underlining 
actions Manners encompassed the idea that normative power should be, 
“perceived as persuasive in the actions taken to promote such principles” and 
underlined that, “if normative justification is to be convincing or attractive, then 
the actions taken must involve persuasion, argumentation, and the conferral of 
prestige or shame” (ibid, p. 3). Continued with the impact, noting as ‘normative 
power should ultimately be envisaged as socializing in the impact of the actions 
taken to promote such principles’ he brought clarity to the idea by arguing , ‘if 
normative justification is to be convincing or attractive, then its impact must be 
involve socialization, partnership, and ownership’ (ibid). Finally, by indicating 
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having broader consequences in world politics specified that ‘normative power 
has three broader consequences concerning the possibility of more holistic, 
justifiable, and sustainable world politics’ (ibid). He discussed more extensively 
the possibilities that “holistic thinking demands more thorough consideration of 
the rationale/principles, practices/actions, and consequences/impact of 
actors/agents in world politics” continued,  “the prioritizing of normative power 
may help ensure that any subsequent use of material incentives and/or physical 
force is thought about and utilized in a more justifiable way” and finally pointing 
out the fact that “normative power with its emphasis on holistic thinking and 
justifiable practices raises the possibility that a more sustainable world politics 
embraces both the power of ideas, the ‘thinkable’, and physical power, the 
‘material’” (ibid). 
Subsequently, normative power as mentioned above should be understood, as 
power of the form where power that is ideational and ability to use normative 
justification rather than to use ‘material incentives or physical force’ (Manners 
2009a, 2009b, and 2010a). 
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3 Theoretical Framework  
3.1 Institutional Structure of Russian-EU Relations 
This chapter is dedicated to analyzing and discussing theoretical framework of my 
research and I will try to apply institutional theorist perspective. Certainly, the 
Europe-Russia relationship can be analyzed from different theoretical perspectives 
such as functionalism, neo-functionalism, institutionalism, regime theory and 
others. This study considers the Institutionalism approach particularly relevant. 
Before commencing a discussion of Institutionalism it is important to review 
the Russian-EU relations’ institutional structure. The relationship between Russia 
and the EU is on the base of a well-established institutional structure that enables 
sides to discuss global problems on different levels. Nutshell, the applied formats 
of the Russia-EU cooperation mostly base on Summits. The Summits play an 
essential role in institutional structure and define the strategic direction of 
relations. Generally, they are held twice a year, in the first half of the year it takes 
place in Russia and in the second half in Brussels according to the practice 
established after Lisbon treaty. The Russian Federation is represented by 
President and Ministers who are responsible for specific areas of cooperation with 
the Union. Representatives from the EU side are the President of European 
Council, the President of European Commission and the High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Since the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement signed in 1997, Russia and EU have held a total 30 
summits, the latest took place in Brussels on 20-21 December 2012. 
The cooperation also covers the following dense meeting agenda such as, the 
meeting of the Russian Government and the European Commission (working on 
legal approximation, Partnership and Cooperation Agreement liabilities, etc.), the 
session of the Permanent Partnership Council at Foreign Ministers' level 
(including different spheres such as energy, transport, justice and home affairs, 
science and technologies, education, etc.). The Permanent Partnership Council 
(PPC) was replaced with the Cooperation Council in 2003 and was considered the 
main working entity of the Russian-EU cooperation. Also meetings at Political 
Directors' level (meetings between the Permanent Representative of Russia to the 
EU and the Chairman of the EU Political and Security Committee) are included. 
The regular monthly base meetings between Russian Permanent Representative to 
the EU and the leadership of the EU Political and Security Committee are another 
useful instrument of cooperation. During these meetings sides discuss and 
exchange views on wide range of international issues. Agenda of each meeting is 
based on the provided proposals from both sides and depend on the current 
international situation. 
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The senior officials and expert level political dialogue is organized in the 
framework of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Political Directors' and the 
Russian Permanent Representative to the EU and the Chairman of the EU Political 
and Security Committee meetings. The expert-level consultation and discussions 
cover wide range of international and regional issues. The meetings between 
Russian and European parliamentarians in the scope of the Parliamentary 
Cooperation Committee are important elements to the political dialogue between 
parties. 
3.1.1  Definition, Formation and Changes of the Institution 
The first and foremost fundamental question about each approach will be 
regarding its definition of an institution. During my study several questions rose 
concerning institutions (e.g. defining institution, formation and changes of 
institution) and gained importance for studying. This part aims to contribute 
answering below mentioned set of cases from the perspective of the new 
institutionalism. What is an institution? March and Olsen argued that “an 
institution is not necessarily a formal structure but rather is better understood as a 
collection of norms, rules, understandings, and perhaps most importantly 
routines” (Peters 2012, p. 28). They provided definition to political institutions as 
follows: 
“Collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions in terms of 
relations between roles and situations. The process involves determining what the situation 
is, what role is being fulfill led, and what obligation of that role in that situation is” (Peters 
2012, p. 29). 
They also provided definition of the institutions by the characteristics they 
display as, “political institutions are collections of interrelated rules and routines 
that define appropriate action in terms of relations between roles and situations” 
(p. 28). Institutions as well are defined by their durability and their capacity to 
influence behavior of individuals. Peters (2012) discussed the main important 
feature of the March and Olsen conceptualization and argued, “…institutions 
[which] have a ‘logic of appropriateness’ that influences behavior more than a 
‘logic of consequentiality’ that also might shape individual action” (ibid). Other 
most important feature of the March and Olsen conceptualization is that the Role 
theory is seen as a more general element of understanding of political institution 
(ibid). 
The second question proposed was about the formation of institution. What is 
the base of the institution in the formation process? From the perspective of the 
new intuitionalists (March and Olsen), argument, “Norms were assumed to be 
central to the nature of institutions” (ibid, p. 34).  Where do the rules and norms 
that form institutions come from? March and Olsen’s discussion and initial 
approach towards mentioned question was “institutions derive a good deal of their 
structure of meaning, and their logic of appropriateness, from the society from 
which they are formed” (ibid). The other approach to the conception of formation 
was mentioned by Selznick (1957) as, “…institutions are created when an 
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organization is infused with values greater than would be necessary simply to 
achieve their formal purposes of the organization” (ibid). 
The next, concern was about changes inside institutions. So it is clear that, 
obvious patterns within institutions are not constant, they are changing once they 
are formed. Changes in the institutions are a normal process, and as mentioned 
“… one of the strongest and most persuasive component (Brunsson and Olsen, 
1993). The March and Olsen’s arguments on institutions changes motioned in 
their famous "garbage can" approach to decision-making. The March and Olsen 
“garbage-can” approach conceptualizes solutions looking for problems. 
According to Boin and ‘t Hart (2000) institutional crisis should be counted as 
another means for conceptualizing changes. 
Finally, I’m willing to discuss the operation of the institution. How does an 
institution work? By mentioning normative institutionalism this question is fully 
covered and responded. A set of norms for individual behavior is a crucial 
element in defining manner. Therefore normative compliance is a central factor to 
the institutions’ functioning from this theoretical perspective. In other words, 
Peters argued that, “…source of compliance then is derived from a normative 
commitment to the institution and its purposes” (2012, p. 41). 
3.2 New and Old Institutionalism Perspective  
After defining of institution and the structure of the Russian-EU relations, it 
requires profound explanation of institutionalism per se. In retrospect, the roots of 
political science go through institutions. Mentioned approach was criticized post-
World War II by American scholars and their argumentations were based on more 
individualistic assumptions, indicating the existence of two theoretical approaches 
that political science stands on: behavioralism and rational choice (Peters 2012, p. 
2). Peters discussed mentioned approaches as, “…assume that individuals act 
autonomously as individuals, based either on socio-psychological characteristics 
or rational calculation of their personal utility” (ibid). 
New Institutionalism contains many features of the older approach in the 
respect of understanding politics but it also provides new theoretical and empirical 
directions. By that relevant example, I will try to explain the differences: the old 
institutionalist thinkers argued that, the presidential system is significantly 
different from parliamentary system based on its structures and rules (Peters 
2012). The new thinker also argues that there are indeed differences but, “what 
ways do those two alternative ways of organizing political life differ, and what 
difference does it make for the performance of the systems” (Weaver and 
Rockman, 1993; Von Mettenheim, 1996).  
New institutionalism is very board theoretical approach as argued by Peters, 
‘the new institutionalism is not a single animal’, it contains the number of entities 
within it (2012, p. 3). The contrast between the new and old institutionalisms in 
political science has been discussed from various perspectives, for instance Philip 
Selznick (1996) pointed out that, “New institutionalism has certain 
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‘deconstructionist’ elements in it because of the focus on the multiplicity and 
complexity of goals” (ibid). On one hand, the word ‘new’ provides an idea of 
existence of the old institutionalism as well; on the other hand, it reveals that new 
version is quite different from the old one. Despite this fact as indicated by me in 
advance a number of coinciding features exist in these two versions. For 
providing a broad explanation and comparative perspective, it is inevitable to start 
my discussion from the old institutionalism and continue later with the new 
vision. A number of scholars (Carl Friedrich, James Bryce, Herman and Samuel 
Finer) produced number of work on old institutionalism, but Apter (1991) 
criticized old institutionalist thinkers, and he articulated that ‘they were simply 
utilizing different techniques for different purposes as against most contemporary 
social scientists’ (Peters 2012, p. 3). 
The institutions were defined and analyzed by the world most well-known 
political-thinkers over centuries. Before turning to retrospect of political thinkers’ 
approaches, the question coming to mind first, is why designing political 
institutions is required, Guys Peters explained it by, “...mercurial and fickle nature 
of individual behavior, and the need to direct that behavior toward collective 
purposes” (2012, p. 3). As one of the first political philosophers Plato analyzed 
and identified the success of these institutions in governing and indicated the 
necessity of forming other institutions on base of that observation. The same 
tradition of the institutional analysis was continued during centuries. In other 
words for instance, Thomas Hobbes argued, ‘necessity of strong institutions to 
save humankind from its own worst instincts’, and John Locke argued that, “[to 
have] a public institutions and began the path toward more democratic structures”. 
The list can be extended, but the major point will almost be the same as 
mentioned in “political thinking has its roots in the analysis and design of 
institutions” (Peters 2012, p. 4). 
According to Peters there are the following defining characteristics of the old 
institutionalism, firstly identified, “law and central role of the law” (Peters 2012, 
p. 8). As in most Continental countries, law is the essential element of governance 
and plays a significant role (ibid). Law constitutes the framework of public sector 
and provides privileges to affect behavior of its citizens. Therefore a political 
institution is to be concerned by law. A second dominating assumption was the 
structure, as Peters (2012) argued, “structure determines behavior” (ibid). In other 
words, structural characteristic of the old institutionalism emphasizes the 
institutional features of political systems, for instance, such as presidential or 
parliamentary, federal or unitary etc. He continued the comparativist approach of 
the old institutionalism and emphasized that formal-legal analysis required the 
usage of the other systems for finding new alternatives. The next characteristic 
feature of the old institutionalism is historical foundation and here analysis should 
refer to retrospect. Finally, the older institutionalists should have a strong 
normative element in their analysis, as noted, “political science emerged from 
distinctly normative roots” (p. 11).  
Subsequently, old institutionalists developed a rich and important body of 
scholarship. Besides over the years’ critics directed on to their works but 
doubtless new institutionalism derived or developed from the root of the old 
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schools features, for that matter of understanding the new institutionalism 
understanding institutionalists and school thought between times is required. 
New institutionalism emphasizes the importance of formal institutions in 
facilitating cooperation. In this study, the legal basis for relations of  the European 
Union with Russia was the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (1994) that 
set principles of the established the institutional framework for bilateral 
cooperation and dialogue in a number of areas. By focusing on the following 
argument, we can easily propose that the EU-Russian relations are 
institutionalized, but the institutions are not automatically working as main stream 
of the institutionalism propose.  
In that case the new institutionalism approach stands out and should be 
discussed further. The new institutionalism is one well-matched theoretical 
perspective that provides a tool for analyzing European integration. The success 
of these two disciplinary revolutions, behaviorism and rational choice were the 
main background of the new institutionalism. New institutionalism has driven 
from the works of James March and Johan Olsen (1984; 1989; 1996; Olsen, 
2006). The scholars indicated that, “political science, to some extent have been 
directing far too much of its theoretical and conceptual energies in directions that 
would diminish the centrality of the political values and collective choice” (Peters 
2012, p. 25). In other words, the “centrality of values in political analysis was 
being replaced with individualistic, and largely utilitarian, assumptions and 
methodologies” (ibid). March and Olsen further argued that, “organizations and 
institutions are central for understanding the role of values and collective choices 
in politics” (ibid).  The approach of March and Olsen’s solutions to the theoretical 
problems have been criticized by several political scholars (Jordan, 1990; 
Pedersen, 1991; Searing, 1991; Sened, 1991). Dowding (1994) argued that they 
are, “fundamentally misinterpreted rational choice theory” (ibid). Despite 
mentioned critiques, March and Olsen’s theoretical perspectives have 
significantly changed the nature of discourse of the contemporary political 
science. 
There is a particular version or sub-field of the new institutionalism named as 
normative institutionalism. Normative institutionalism is one of the main 
theoretical frameworks of EU decision-making on foreign policy. This theory 
highlights two ways in which European Union’s substantive and procedural 
norms, provided opportunities negotiate on divergent policy preferences. 
Normative institutionalism refers to “central role assigned to norms and values 
within organizations in explaining behavior in this approach” (Peters 2012, p. 26). 
Normative institutionalism is sometimes seen as the new institutionalism, but not 
as a particular version. Selznick differentiated that “organizations as the structural 
expression of rational action and organizations as more adaptive and normative 
structures” (ibid). March and Olsen made a distinction between aggregative and 
integrative political processes. And as they indicated, “the former is in essence a 
contractual form for organizations in which individuals participate largely for 
personal gain and the latter form of organization comes closer to the idea of an 
institution as expressing a ‘logic of appropriateness’” (Peters 2012, p. 26). The 
logic of appropriateness is the central concept in the normative version of the new 
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institutionalism. Participation in integrative institutions is taken as the base of 
commitment to the goals of the organization. These distinctions between 
integrative and aggregative organizations discussed by Etzioni (1975) and he 
argued that, “organization had three types of power that they could manipulate 
over members, or perhaps three types of incentives, firstly coercive, remunerative, 
and normative and continued that the individual members of organizations had 
also three types of in those structure, alienative, calculative, and moral” (ibid, p. 
27).  
Accordingly, Peters analyzed that March and Olsen considered “normative 
basis more appropriate for political action than the calculative basis” (2012, p. 
27). Normative institutionalism reflects an influence of the traditional forms of 
institutionalism that “rejects the full rationality of the autonomous individual 
assumed to exist in much of contemporary political science” (ibid). Subsequently, 
the March and Olsen perspective on institutions provided several important 
theoretical elements to the political discipline. First, going back to the roots of 
institutionalism, in the other words, as Peters noted, “…[in the] sense of the 
collective, as opposed to individual”, individuals are very important part of the 
normative institutionalism (2012, p. 45). The second element considered by 
March and Olsen is that “behavior in institutions is normative rather than 
coercive” (ibid). 
3.3 Delimitation of the Theory 
In this part of my study, I want to elucidate the limits of institutionalism that have 
been the subject of great deal of criticism. One most important critics of theory 
come through as “natural adversaries of the approach” such as rational choice 
theorist (Sened 1991, Dowding 1994). The critics was that “unlike their own more 
explicit assumptions about human behavior, there is little if any explicit 
argumentation about human behavior in the normative version of institutionalism” 
(Peters 2012, p. 42). The other most important critiques on the value-based new 
institutionalism is focused on the internal logic of the theory, while others theories 
focus on its capacity to explain the political phenomena (ibid). Another, most 
fundamental criticism of new institutionalism is that, it is not ‘falsifiable’, as 
mentioned by Peters, “the criteria for the existence of a ‘logic of appropriateness’ 
within an institution are sufficiently vague [it is not possible to say] they did not 
exist and …did not influence the behavior of the members of the organization” (p.  
43). 
Finally, the role of institutions and "the logic of appropriateness" were in the 
center of discussions and as Dowding (1994) argued, “March and Olsen have 
removed human decision-making completely from the process” (ibid). The 
argument was on the base that even “if institutions do constrain choice there will 
be some opportunity in practice, if not in the theory, to violate norms, or to 
interpret institutional values differently, or otherwise to exercise individual 
judgment” (ibid).  
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4 Methodology  
4.1 Qualitative Research Design and Data Collection 
In this chapter the fundamental characteristics of selected qualitative research 
design will be explored. As suggested in the previous sections qualitative research 
methods and appropriate methods were utilized for this study. Generally as argued 
by Byman (2004) using of the qualitative and quantitative methods increases 
possibilities for exploring and defining more aspect of phenomenon, as in his 
words, “…[it] leads to a better result or a better understanding” (1992, pp. 59-61). 
There are several approaches on qualitative research, Denzin and Lincoln 
approaches convey the ever-changing nature of qualitative inquiry and they define 
qualitative research as following: 
“Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists 
of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible. These practices 
transform the world. They turn the world into a series of representations, including field 
notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the self. At this 
level, qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This 
means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make 
sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them” (Byman 
2004, p. 3). 
According to Creswell (2007), “…qualitative research begins with 
assumptions, a worldview, the possible use of a theoretical lens, and the study of 
research problems inquiring into the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a 
social or human problem” (2007, p. 37). One of the main purposes of this chapter 
is to bring clarity to the characteristics of utilized quantitative research approaches 
and methodology for data collection. As Bryman (2004) revealed, “Quantitative 
research is associated with a number of different approaches to data collection” 
(2004, p. 11). To carry out this research, chosen method allows to collect data by 
using interview method as well as by selecting case study making topic 
manageable and provides important grounding for the Russian normativisim, 
“researchers collect data in natural settings with a sensitivity to the people under 
study, and they analyze their data inductively to establish patterns or themes” 
(Creswell 2004, p. 37). Qualitative research design provides the following 
features to researchers such as “…appropriateness of methods and theories; 
perspectives of the participants and their diversity; reflexivity of the researcher 
and the research; variety of approaches and methods in qualitative research” 
(Flick 2009, p. 14). In other words according to Flick qualitative research is 
“…the correct choice of appropriate methods and theories; the recognition and 
analysis of different perspectives; the researchers' reflections on their research as 
part of the process of knowledge production; and the variety of approaches and 
methods (ibid). 
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The EU-Russian relations especially discussions of their power characteristic 
provide one of the main grounding for researchers to develop complex picture of 
the problem or issue under this study. Creswell (2007) indicated that qualitative 
research involves, “…identifying the many factors involved in a situation, and 
generally sketching the larger picture that emerges” however, “researchers are 
bound not by tight cause-and-effect relationships among factors, but rather by 
identifying the complex interactions of factors in any situation” (2007, p. 39). On 
the other hand, qualitative research provides a chance to make an interpretation of 
what: “they see, hear, and understand” (ibid). Creswell (2007) highlighted that the 
researchers, “interpretations cannot be separated from their own background, 
history, context, and prior understandings” (ibid). 
To carry out this study multiple source of data is required that is considered as 
a key instrument for qualitative research. The qualitative researchers collect data 
through examining documents, observing behavior, and interviewing participants 
(Creswell 2007). On the other hand, qualitative researchers “typically gather 
multiple forms of data, such as interviews, observations, and documents, rather 
than rely on a single data source” (ibid).   
Consequently, the chosen study method and research design can be thought as 
the main logic or the plan of a study. Takona (2002) indicated that the research 
design is “a logic in a set of procedures that optimises the validity of data for a 
given research problem” (p. 319). On one hand Mouton indicated that the research 
design serves to "plan, structure and execute" the research to maximize the 
"validity of the findings" (1996, p. 175). On the other hand, Yin emphasized that 
"colloquially a research design is an action plan for getting from here to there, 
where 'here' may be defined as the initial set of questions to be answered and 
"there' is some set of (conclusions) answers" (2003, p. 19). 
4.2 Expert In-Depth Interview 
In order to get a comprehensive data on Russian normativisim or normative 
offensive within relations with the EU, three prominent Russian studies scholars 
have been selected and interviewed by different relevant methods. Selecting 
informants (experts) realized in the framework of their field. Russian studies 
experts solved the issue of collecting the necessary data on Russian normativism 
by means of the following way: two of them selected from Europe base Russian 
studies institutes (i.e. international experts). One of the experts was selected from 
one the Russian Federation universities (i.e. local expert) for the determining 
multi-vision. The logic behind multi-vision in-depth interview provided an 
opportunity to avoid being bias on different cases, especially on discussions of 
Russia being great or normative power. 
As indicated by May (1997), “the interviews yield rich insights into people’s 
experiences, opinions, aspirations, attitudes and feelings”… however, “…social 
researchers need to understand the dynamics of interviewing sharpen their own 
use of the method and understand the different methods of conducting interviews 
and analyzing the data, together with an awareness of their strengths and 
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limitations” (p. 110). Kvale (1983) defines the qualitative research interview as 
“...whose purpose is to gather descriptions of the life-world of the interviewee 
with respect to interpretation of the meaning of the described phenomena” (p. 
174). Meuser and Nagel (2002) discuss the expert interviews as a specific form of 
applying semi-structured interviews. Bogner and Menz provided a more clearly 
formulated definition of expert and expert knowledge as: 
“Experts have technical process oriented and interpretive knowledge referring to their 
specific professional sphere of activity. Thus, expert knowledge does not only consist of 
systematized and reflexively accessible specialist knowledge, but it has the character of 
practical knowledge in big parts. Different and even disparate precepts for activities and 
individual rules of decision, collective orientations and social interpretive patterns are part 
of it. The experts' knowledge and orientations for practices, relevancies etc. have also - and 
this is decisive - a chance to become hegemonic in a specific organizational or functional 
context. This means, experts have the opportunity to assert their orientations at least partly. 
By becoming practically relevant, the experts' knowledge structures the practical conditions 
of other actors in their professional field in a substantial way” (Flick 2009, p. 166). 
In-depth interview with selected experts was realized for this study. In 
different literatures we came across the fact that in-depth interviews can be used 
to achieve different aims. Bogner and Menz suggest a typology of in-depth 
interviews that includes three alternatives: “They can be used (1) for exploration, 
for orientation in a new field in order to give the field of study a thematic structure 
and to generate hypotheses. This can also be used for preparing the main 
instrument in a study for other target groups. Systematized in-depth interview (2) 
can be used to collect context information complementing insights coming from 
applying other methods. (3) Theory-generating in-depth interviews aim at 
developing a typology or a theory about an issue from reconstructing the 
knowledge of people working in certain institutions concerning the needs of a 
specific target group” (Flick 2009, pp. 166-67).     
Development in technology provided new alternatives and innovations for 
realizing qualitative interviews. Researchers commenced using three main types 
of internet-based qualitative research methods: online synchronous interviews, 
online asynchronous interviews, and virtual focus groups (Meho 2006, p. 1285). 
Due to the request of experts, I have organized in-depth expert interviews in 
different ways, i.e. on the base of emails and as well as via an instant messenger. 
Questions that experts replied almost overlapped but analyses showed that results 
do not coincide and this diversity provided fruitful results to this study.   
One of the main advantages of in-depth interviewing is the confidential 
atmosphere in which informants can share ‘sensitive’ information (Boyce and 
Neale 2006). Informants are able to provide details about their personal 
experiences, views, and behavior (ibid). On the other hand, the in-depth interview 
according to Boyce and Neale, “provides much more detailed information than 
what is available through other data collection methods, such as surveys” (2006, 
p. 3). 
Besides advantages, the in-depth expert interview has been characterized by 
the following limitations. One of the important limitations of the in-depth expert 
interview is to finding or identifying right experts in the appropriate field of study 
and also convincing them to give an interview (Flick 2009). On the other hand, as 
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Flick (2009) identified experts, “demand a high level of expertise from the 
interviewer - for understanding the relevant, often rather complex processes the 
interview is about and for asking the right questions and for probing in an 
appropriate way” (p. 168). Also confidentiality issue is always considered as an 
important case for expert in-depth interview, “…often, delicate issues for an 
organization, also in competition with other players in the market …” (ibid). 
Subsequently, indicated type of interviewing (e-mail and voice instant 
messenger) methods offer more opportunities for qualitative researcher, as Meho 
(2006) argued it is “providing access to millions of potential research participants 
who are otherwise inaccessible…” and “…method can be employed quickly, 
conveniently, and inexpensively and can generate high-quality data when handled 
carefully” (p. 1293). On the other hand, this method can be characterized by 
following limitations such as: “[not all] informants have access to the Internet 
[and] require skills in online communication from both interviewer and 
interviewees, etc.” (Meho 2006, p. 1292). 
4.3 Qualitative Case Study and Case Selection 
As Byman and Bell (2007) argued, “there is no one way to define case study 
method” but there are several available conceptions for defining case study. 
According to him “the basic case study entails the detailed and intensive analysis 
of a single case” (p. 62). Creswell (2007) emphasized that qualitative approach 
case study is “…investigator explores a bounded system (a case) or multiple 
bounded systems (cases) over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection 
involving multiple sources of information and reports a case description and case-
based themes” (p. 73). Stake (2007) states “case study research concerned with 
the complexity and particular nature of the case in question (ibid). Hammersley, 
Gomm and Foster (2000) introduced three variations in case study: descriptive, 
explanatory and explorative case study options (pp. 118-125). 
In this study, for defining and analyzing Russian normativisim in the trans-
border cooperation with the European Union, the Northern Dimensions initiative 
was selected as a single case study. By selecting this initiative as a case study and 
exploring the Russian Federation’s changed foreign policy enhanced scope of this 
study and provided profound grounding for analyzing RF foreign policy concepts 
since 2000s. According to George and Bennet, “a single study cannot address all 
the interesting aspects of a historical event” and also “it is important to recognize 
that a single event can be relevant for research on a variety of theoretical topics” 
(2007, p. 127). According to Donmoyer (2007) there are some advantages of case 
study. Firstly, “accessibility of case study enables us to get deep information 
about some phenomena, events, people etc.” and secondly case study “gives 
opportunity to see the phenomena or events from various frames” (ibid). 
According to Creswell (2007) case studies are different and one main 
distinguishing factor is a size of bound of case (i.e. several individuals, a group, 
an entire program, or an activity). And he proposed that three variations exist in 
terms of intent by taking into consideration Stake’s (1995) writings. They are 
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followings: the single instrumental case study, the collective or multiple case 
studies, and the intrinsic case study”. Initially in a single instrumental case study 
“the researcher focuses on an issue or concern, and then selects one bounded case 
to illustrate this issue and secondly, in a collective case study (multiple case 
study), “the one issue or concern is again selected, but the inquirer selects 
multiple case studies to illustrate the issue” (p. 74). According to him, the final 
type of case study design is an intrinsic case study where “the focus is on the case 
itself (e.g., evaluating a program, or studying a student having difficulty) because 
the case presents an unusual or unique situation” (ibid). There are several 
available procedures for conducting case studies (Merriam, 1998; Stake, 1995; 
Yin, 2003; George and Bennet 2007), Creswell (2007) identified that “a case 
study is a good approach when the inquirer has clearly identifiable cases with 
boundaries and seeks to provide an in-depth understanding of the cases or a 
comparison of several cases” (p. 74). Creswell indicated that data collection in 
case study research is typically extensive and Yin (2003) provided six types of 
information to collect: documents, archival records, interviews, direct 
observations, participant-observations, and physical artifacts (p. 75). 
4.4 Operationalization 
To carry out this study, I have chosen to utilize a single case method that enables 
profound analysis of Russian normativisim in trans-border relations. Accordingly, 
in global governance Russia as well as other powers is characterized as normative 
offensive especially after 2000s Russia displayed its strong ambitions in all kinds 
of relations. The analyses consist of the following parts. As starting point, I have 
tried to analyze the global governance and in that stance, I have shed light on 
typology of power for conceptualizating normative power notion. The theoretical 
lens provided grounding to analyze the institutional relations between sides as 
well as to narrow down the scope of study. Following variables derived from 
theoretical lens of study: powerism, normativism, and institutionalized 
relationship. Exploring Russian political orientation and its foreign policy 
concepts became an essential element for this study because starting from 2000s 
Russian political trajectory has been changed and Russia has become one of the 
main powers of the world political arena and started pursuing normative foreign 
policy towards counterparts. 
By analyzing foreign policy concept of the RF and other relevant documents 
as well chosen case study allowed me to evaluate and examine Russian normative 
foreign policy apart from the current energy relations. As mentioned above, 
Russia is considered as normative power in energy relations with the Union. In the 
next chapter, I’ll provide analysis of the EU normative power concepts that 
enables comprehending different discussions over normativisim per se. On one 
hand, I will touch upon Russian political transformations (2000-2008) that are 
considered as starting point for Russian normativisim. On the other hand defined 
variables for this study will be examined in relevant chapters.   
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5 Europe Normative Power 
5.1 Historical Approach 
First, it should to noted that the European Union has been characterized in a very 
broad sense. Most prominent scholars named the EU differently, Wallace’s (1983) 
approach should be considered as the most important where he characterized the 
EU as “less than a federation, more than a regime” (Jupille and Caporaso 1999, p. 
429).  One of the major characterizations of the EU as a power was on normativity 
that caused discussions and debates over two decades. A concept of normative 
power concept refers to the place where states (organizations) started playing an 
important role in other actors’ actions, such as productive or structural powers, 
“power nearly becomes an attribute that an actor possesses and may use 
knowingly as a resource to shape the actions or conditions of action of others” 
(Barnett and Duvall 2005, p. 45). Before I start discussing of Europe Normative 
power (NPE), it is mandatory to note that the concept of NPE conception has 
attracted much excitement among scholars worldwide, as Bickerton (2007) 
indicated scholars started describing the EU in some ‘adjectival prefixes’. In this 
regard, what capacities the EU possesses, and to what extent the capacity 
possessed has an impact in the world politics should be defined in advance. 
Characteristics of the power possessed by European Union can be enumerated in 
the following order - civilizing or civilizational power (Duchêne 1972; Sjursen 
2006a, 2006b), quiet superpower (Moravscik 2002; 2004), ethical power 
(Aggestam 2008), postmodern superpower (McCormick 2006), responsible power 
(Mayer and Vogt 2006), vanishing mediator (Nicolaidis 2004) and gentle power 
(Merlini 2001; Paddoa-Schioppa 2001). After this brief introduction to the 
characteristic of the power possessed by the EU, it will be interesting to sum up 
provided different characteristics and define the main routine of the EU External 
relations starting with Duchene’s approach. The table below presents the 
summary of the EU power scope. 
Table 2: Characteristic of power by year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Huelss 2008, p. 7 
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The ideational dimension of the European Union’s external policy is one of 
the most significant subjects of European Studies.  Over the years it was widely 
discussed and debated to grasp Union’s role in world politics, or in other words “a 
history of the attempt to understand the European Community/Union’s place in 
the international system” (Doidge 2008, pp. 33-34). For grasping and 
understanding “what the EU is doing” it is required to move beyond the 
Westphalian concept of state order toward a “post-ontological” stage (Caparaso 
1996). The post-modern notion of “actorness without an actor” vividly explains to 
what extent the European foreign policy continues to be “less than a state, but 
more than a conventional intergovernmental organization” (Hill 1993, p. 309). 
That is why, Manners argued that, “think[ing] of the ideational impact of the EU’s 
international identity/role as representing normative power” (Manners 2002, p. 
238). As Manners indicated the presence of the EU’s manifest in the international 
arena is ‘productive power’ or the ‘power over concept’ (Manners 2002, p. 239). 
Research in the context of the ‘normative power’ in Europe was debated over 
two decades, Ian Manners counted one of the pioneering and prominent scholars 
of European Studies, where he has started the prolific debates over the visions, 
ideations, values and principles of the Union. Firstly, Manners introduced the 
concept of the Normative Power Europe as the ‘ability to shape conceptions of 
“normal” in international relations’ (Manners 2002, p. 239). He noticed the fact 
that besides the previous conceptualizations of the EU within narrow confines of 
military versus civilian power, the EU should be counted as a normative power. 
The European Union is normative power, because “it changes the norms, 
standards and prescriptions of world politics away from the bounded expectations 
of state-centricity” (2002, p. 46). Therefore, the EU should be learnt according to 
‘what it is’ rather than ‘what it does or says’ (Manners 2002, p. 252).  
The idea of NPE goes with its roots to Duchêne’s (1973) ‘idée force’ and 
Galtung’s (1973) ‘ideological power’. Duchêne (1972) defined the EU as a 
civilian, i.e. ‘special international actor whose strength lies in its ability to 
promote and encourage stability through economic and political means’ (Duchêne 
1972; Sjursen 2004) rather than physical coercive force.  Manners’ augmentations 
of characterization of civilian power are based on three central dimensions. He 
indicated that civilian power should characterized by the followings, ‘diplomatic 
cooperation to solve international problems’ (multilateralism); ‘centrality of 
economic power’ (nonmilitary); and ‘legally-binding supranational institutions’ 
(international law) (Manners 2000a, p. 26; 2002, pp. 236–7). And finalizing it can 
be concluded that the civil or civilizing power concept is much more relevant to 
“Eurocentric (neo) colonial perceptions of the rest of the world and the 
importance of state and physical power” (Manners 2006c, p.184). 
Even, Manners in his well-known paper (Normative Power Europe: A 
contradiction in Terms?) indicated that “the idea of normative power in the 
international sphere is not new – Carr made the distinction between economic 
power, military power and power over opinion” (Carr 1962, p. 108). For 
differentiating the concept of normative power from military power (Bull 1982) 
and the concept of civilian power (Duchêne 1972), Manners (2002) placed the 
identity and nature of the Union into a different framework in which he aimed for 
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replacing “the state as the centre of concern and refocusing on the ideations and 
power of norms as the substantive basics of the EU studies” (2002, p. 236). 
Manners defined the European Union and normative power according to three 
sources that normative power derives from. Those are historical context, hybrid 
polity and political-legal constitutionalism (2002, pp. 240-1). As explanation, he 
argued about the legacy of two destructive wars for historical context. Hybrid 
polity is a feature of the Union from Westphalian order with supranational and 
international institutions and political-legal constitutionalism from his perspective 
come through elite-driven, treaty-based legal nature of the Union (ibid). 
Aforementioned three features are the main grounding for actors to assemble 
under the same framework with common principles and values. Lucarelli and 
Manners (2006) finalized it by mentioning that common principles and values 
constitute ‘the EU as a political entity’ and ‘EU’s aim of setting standards for the 
others through means of spreading norms rather than being powerful with either 
military or economic sources’ (Diez and Manners 2007, p. 175). The legitimacy 
for the EU norms comes from framework of ‘cosmopolitan law’ and ‘European 
social preference as the basis for the legitimacy of the EU’s normative’ (Sjursen 
2006a, pp. 244-8, Laïdi, 2005; 2006). 
Unsurprisingly, the EU’s norm-driven behavior brought tremendous success in 
sharing and spreading democracy and prosperity not only for member states but 
also for the rest of the world. Subsequently, the Union is doing system change, not 
regime change. The Union is doing it slowly and on the basis of partnership. As 
Bickerton (2011) defined Normative Power Europe can be understood as part of a 
wider effort to find for the EU’s foreign policy a clear source of legitimacy (2011, 
p. 25). Whitman (2011) noted that, “normative and value-driven features of the 
EU can be surely predicated upon the developments in the area of foreign policy 
cooperation and the accompanying emphasis on the importance of values and 
norms for conduct of external relations by EU policy circles”. Huakkala affirmed 
that, for the Union the linkage between norms, values and foreign policy is very 
obvious and incontestable (2009, p. 133). Certainly, norms and principles are the 
main ground the EU identity and it stands and also it shape Union role in 
international arena as one of the main foreign policy actor as stated in Article 2 of 
the Lisbon Treaty: 
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in 
which pluralism, nondiscrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between 
women and men prevail”. 
Also, the European Security Strategy (ESS) shed light on aforesaid values that 
are as well the core principles of the EU’s external relations: 
“Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with 
corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are 
the best means of strengthening the international order”. 
According to Manners, there are nine substantive normative principles of the 
Union, and he highlighted that five of them are ‘core’ norms (peace, liberty, 
democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms) 
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and in addition there are four ‘minor’ norms (social solidarity, anti-discrimination, 
sustainable development and good governance) and all of these values (norms) 
grounding are based on the Union’s treaties (i.e. European Economic Community 
of 1957, also known as the Treaty of Rome and Treaty on European Union of 
1993 (TEU)) and also in other relevant declarations and/or policies. 
5.1.1  Norm Spreading Mechanism 
Meanwhile, before commencing the discussions of aforesaid substantial nine 
normative principles, I’m willing to shed light on the mechanism of norms 
spreading. As Manners (2002) purposed six factors were drawn by Whitehead 
(1996), Manners and Whitman (1998), and Kinnvall (1995). Firstly, spreading 
norms can be thought as a contagion, in other words norm diffusion happens 
unintentionally or EU leads by ‘virtuous example’ and other actor just imitates it. 
Secondly, it is informational as this is the result of the strategic communications, 
such as new policy initiatives and declaratory communications. Third, the 
mechanism is procedural to the institutionalization of a relationship between the 
EU and a third party, as Manners mentioned “inter-regional co-operation 
agreement, membership of an international organization or enlargement of the EU 
itself”, and as an example we can mention the inter-regional dialogue with the 
Southern African Development Community or the membership of the EU in the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) (2002, p. 244). Fourth is the transference that 
happens when the EU exchanges goods trade or technical assistance with the third 
party. The existing conditionality, including economic sanctions and financial 
rewards can be shown as an example for aforesaid type of mechanism. Manners 
indicated overt as a fourth factor as it appears as a result of physical presence of 
the EU in third states and international organizations, in other words through 
Commission’s monitoring missions. The final mechanism indicated is, cultural 
filter that affects the impact of international norms and political learning in third 
states and organizations leading to learning, adaptation or rejection of norms 
(Kinnvall, 1995, pp. 61-71). As an example for cultural filter the diffusion of 
democratic norms in China and human rights diffusion in Turkey (Manners 2002, 
p. 245) can be noted. The presented mechanism helps the Union, to “define what 
passes for ‘normal’ in world politics” as said by Manners (p. 253). 
5.2 Normative Norms of the European Union 
The EU is an important organization that promotes a series of normative 
principles not only among members but also within the United Nations system for 
being universally applicable. As Manners evaluated “[the] EU is a normative 
power by virtue of its hybrid polity consisting of supranational and international 
forms of governance” and “act[ing] ethically good way” (Manners 2008, p. 45). 
Backing to external actions, Manners and other most prominent scholars indicated 
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that the European Union is a normative power of the world politics, because of its 
constitutive elements and values-driven base that made the Union one of the main 
international actors. Article 3-5 of Treaty of Lisbon presents the executive 
objective of the Union’s as follows: 
“In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and 
interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, 
the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free 
and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the 
rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international 
law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter”. 
The core values and principles illustrated in Articles 3-5 where it is indicated 
that the Union seeks to promote in the wider world. The rest of this section is 
dedicated to discussing the nine normative principles that are as indicated by 
Manners “substantiated in EU law and policies, and which it seeks to promote in 
world politics” (2008, p. 48).  
The important principle is peace as indicated in Article of 3-1 of TEU as “the 
Union's aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples”. 
Promotion of peace is reckoning as first objective and as determined by Manners 
“sustainable peace addresses the roots or causes of conflict, mirroring the 
European experience of ensuring that war ‘becomes not merely unthinkable, but 
materially impossible’” (Manners 2008, p. 48). The Union’s policy should be 
based on development, aid, interregional cooperation, political dialogue and 
enlargement as elements of a more holistic approach to conflict prevention. The 
extract from treaty peace is of a most prominent value, the European Union inside 
initially intended itself to ensure that the status quo sustained peace over the years 
and continued into the foreseeable future investing for that through membership, 
close and peaceful relations or cooperation with its neighbouring countries (see 
also Union Policies and Internal Actions Art. 26-27). Peace and international 
security are also promoted through the Union’s external actions for strengthening 
peace and security in the rest of the world, the relevant example for this is the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), (See Article 43: joint 
disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and 
assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat 
forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict 
stabilization). 
The second core normative principle is social freedom and as illustrated in 
Article 3-2, “the Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and 
justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is 
ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border 
controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime.” 
Freedom is a very essential and adorable principle of the Union, and operates, 
“within a distinctive socio-legal context” (Manners 2008, pp. 49-50). Manners 
also determined that freedom is “always just one of several rights, held alongside 
other equally important principles such as democracy, human rights and the rule 
of law” (ibid). An extraction from the Union’s treaty illustrates the fact that, the 
Union should offer its citizens freedom and provided five freedoms of persons, 
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goods, services, capital and establishment are promoted within the EU (See Art. 
articles 39–60, Functioning Treaty)  and other types of fundamental freedom 
illustrated in Article 6-3 as, “Fundamental freedoms such as freedom of thought, 
expression, assembly and association are promoted through the 14 articles of the 
freedom title of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFREU) and EU accession to 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (ECPHR) and 
Fundamental Freedoms”. 
The third normative principle of the EU is consensual democracy where main 
grounding is indicated in Art.21-2, as “the Union shall define and pursue common 
policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields 
of international relations, in order to …consolidate and support democracy, the 
rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law”. It operates 
within the EU member states and includes proportional representation of electoral 
systems and power-sharing among parties. As shown in another extraction from 
treaty, democracy should be promoted within the following ways. First internally, 
through the provisions of democratic principles set out in Article 8 (including 
democratic equality, representative and participatory democracy, and the role of 
national parliaments), secondly, via the solidarity clause, which the EU and its 
member states can invoke to protect democratic institutions from any terrorist 
attacks (see more in Art. 222) and finally through enlargement and accession, for 
example during accession process of the Eastern and Central Europe countries the 
EU shared consensual democracy as part of transition. 
The fourth is human rights and it is one of the most important principles of the 
Unions that is also main conditionality for the partnership or cooperation 
illustrated in the Article 6-2 of Treaty of Lisbon as, “the Union shall accede to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR). The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the 
competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties” where treaty article 6-3 
refers to member state obligation and defined as “Fundamental rights, as 
guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union’s 
law”. The term human rights refer to individual and collective human rights  and 
the associative nature of human rights, roots are based on, Declaration on 
European Identity (1973), Declaration of Foreign Ministers of the Community on 
Human Rights (1986)  and the Resolution of the Council on Human Rights, 
Democracy and Development (1991) (Manners 2008, p. 50). As Manners 
indicated, the abovementioned documents highlight “universality and 
indivisibility of these associative human rights with consensual democracy, the 
supranational rule of law and social solidarity” (p. 51).  
The fifth normative principle of the Union is supranational rule of law also 
shown in article 21-2 of the treaty as, “the Union shall seek to develop relations 
and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global 
organisations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It 
shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the 
framework of the United Nations”. The principle of law was explained by 
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Manners (2008) in the following ways: communitarian law (“the supranational 
rule of law inside of Union”), international law (“assisting participation Union and 
members in supranational law above and beyond the EU”) and finally, 
cosmopolitan law (“[refers to] advances the development and participation of the 
EU and its member states in humanitarian law and rights applicable to 
individuals”) (2008, p. 51). Union is ‘exporting’ i.e. sharing its laws through 
partnership with countries all over the world over decades and partners 
intentionally or unintentionally import those laws made by the EU. 
The sixth normative principle of the EU is inclusive equality that found it 
justification in Article 3-3 and as noted there, “It shall combat social exclusion 
and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality 
between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the 
rights of the child.” Within the base charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU that 
came into force in 2000 it is clearly indicated that, “any discrimination based on 
any ground such as sex, race, color, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, 
language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a 
national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation” are 
prohibited. Manners (2008) has drawn attention to the equality promoting inside 
of Europe and he provided three dimensions. First, the identified principles by 
treaty are fundamental principles of the Union; all members should maintain those 
principles. Secondly, he refers to treaty and aforesaid charter has shown forms of 
discrimination that member states should be fighting against. Finally, promotion 
of equality indicated in Charter should be with the attention of that to the cultural 
diversity, gender, the rights of children and the elderly, and the integration of 
persons with disabilities (Manners 2008, p. 53).  
The seventh normative principle of the EU is identified as social solidarity and 
it also found its justification in Article 3-3b treaty as “the Union shall establish an 
internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on 
balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market 
economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of 
protection and improvement of the quality of the environment”. The social 
solidarity is a clear reference to, ‘balanced economic growth’, ‘social market 
economy’, ‘full employment’ and combating ‘social exclusion’, it also promotes 
‘social justice and protection’, intergenerational solidarity, and social solidarity 
among (and between) member states (Manners 2008, p. 53). As mentioned above 
I have drawn attention to promotion of equality (by referring to Art.3-3), social 
solidarity (also includes, intergenerational solidarity, interstate solidarity and 
labour solidarity) to should be kept together with promotion. Social solidarity is 
going to the beyond of intra-Unions relations and formulates Union’s 
development and trade policies. Intergenerational solidarity refers to, “the role of 
the families and the state in providing practical, financial and social support 
across the generations” and interstate solidarity to, “involves a spirit of mutual 
solidarity between member states in order to promote economic, social and 
territorial cohesion” and finally labour solidarity concerned with “promotion of 
labour rights and protection (includes labour standards and fair trade)” (ibid). 
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The eighth normative principle of the EU is embodied in the treaty as a 
sustainable development and expressed in article 21-2 as, “the Union shall define 
and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of 
cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to … help develop 
international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and 
the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure 
sustainable development”. Sustainable development is emphasized on the two 
obstacles and those are balance and integration. Union seeks to promote balanced 
sustainable development, balance between uninhibited economic growth and 
biocentric ecological crisis (Manners 2008, p. 53). Promoting sustainable 
development is realized through enlargement, development, trade, environmental 
and foreign policies and also by encouraging “international environmental 
protection and the sustainable management of global natural resources” (ibid). As 
expressed in aforementioned article of treaty, balanced internal economic growth 
should care for protecting environment. On the other hand, another main goal of 
this principle is eradicating poverty in member countries as well as in other third 
parties. 
Finally, the ninth normative principle of the EU is defined as good 
governance, that finds its justification in Article 21-2h as “the Union shall define 
and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of 
cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to … promote an 
international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global 
governance”. Good governance stress on, quality, representation, participation, 
social partnership, transparency and accountability in the democratic life of the 
Union. Manners indicated that good governance has two distinctive elements, 
namely, the participation of civil society and the strengthening of multilateral 
cooperation which both of them have important internal and external 
consequences (2008, p. 54). By involving participatory democracy, promotion of 
good governance can be achieved by the followings ways: first, openness and 
transparency, second multilateralism; and finally good global governance. 
As sum, it should be said that indicated principles are core values for the 
Union and main grounding to illustrate the Union as normative power playing an 
essential role in international arena, as stated in his interview (2007) by the 
president of Commission Manuel Durão Barroso:  
“We are one of the most important, if not the most important, normative power in the 
world. (…) The candidate countries were adapting their norms to our norms. There is not 
another case, I’m sorry, where the United States or China or Russia, has been able to have 
so many other countries following their patterns. We have gone from originally six 
countries and now we are 27. It means that all those countries completely adhered to our 
standards and our norms. First of all, can you show me any other entity that has achieved 
this?3”  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3 José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission interview with John Peterson, transcribe 
available at “http://www.eu-consent.net/library/BARROSO-transcript.pdf”, date of access: 28/05/2012. 
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As Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008) affirmed “promotion of human 
rights, democracy and the rule of law is both one of the major objectives of EU 
foreign policy and one of the constitutive elements of the EU as a values-driven 
international actor” (2008, p. 223). Therefore, European Union and the United 
States (US)  are without any suspicion significant powers of the world and both 
play essential role in the political arena, “the EU has been, is and always will be a 
normative power in world politics” (Manners 2008, p. 45). 
5.2.1  The Limits of the EU’s Normative Power 
Over the last few years, some of international relations scholars (Sjursen, 2006a; 
Aggestam, 2008; Mayers, 2008; Dunne, 2008) had criticisms and concerns about 
the normative power concept, the debate was around defining and judging the 
merits of the EU’s normative and the main criticisms was on the base that 
normative prefix do not automatically make the EU a legitimate actor in 
international affairs. The most specific concern was on close correspondence 
between normative power and the Union’s visions of itself, and as indicated by 
Sujursen’s (2006a) ‘the fact that [Normative Power Europe] corresponds very 
closely to the EU’s own description of its international role could be enough to set 
the alarm bells ringing’ (p. 235). Later, Hyde-Price affirmed Sujursen’s 
argumentation and added another problem with normative power that was shown 
by him as ‘when the object of study is seen as embodying the core values one 
believes in, it is difficult to achieve any critical distance’ (2006, p. 218). As sum, 
the problem is evident, and as argued by Whitman “EU’s normative power to put 
themselves forward not as analysis but as policy prescription” (2011, p. 29). 
Other important concerns were based on the growing militarization of the EU, 
mostly after the formation of the European Security and Defense Policy (now 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)) military missions outside of 
Europe and outside of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Smith 
(2005a) highlighted it as a main signal for ‘the end of the EU’s normative 
project’. In this regard, definition of normative power also became very 
contentious, and as Whitman (2011) asked, ‘does normative mean civilian 
power?’ and “If normative power is not synonymous with civilian power, what it 
means exactly?” Sjursen (2002, 2005, 2006a) suggests that there is “an inevitably 
coercive aspect to normative power, that is, the ‘power’ part must refer to 
something” and Whitman (2011) indicated as “formulations of the normative 
power concept, needs to combine military and civilian power [which] has been 
fully assimilated”. Mayers’ (2008) argument about ‘responsible Europe’ is 
explicitly referred to the EU’s image. In his words, “a careful consideration [of the 
principles of responsibility] could guide the EU foreign policy-makers, political 
leaders and publicists alike when deciding on the practical form of any 
involvement with global politics” (2008, p. 62). Aggestam (2008, p. 3) in her 
papers suggested to use ‘ethical power Europe’’ rather than ‘normative’, in her 
words, “the distinction between civilian and military instruments so central to the 
concepts of civilian and normative power does not capture more recent 
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developments within the EU that have led to the launch of the European Security 
and Defence Policy (ESDP)” (ibid). The concept of normative power ‘ruined’ 
after the United States’ last several brutal interventions, and this criticism also 
was relevant to Russian case.  In the next chapter I will thoroughly review and try 
to illustrate the flexibility of the normative power concept. Concluding statement 
of Diez was that “the US was as much of a normative power as the EU, but if the 
US is a normative power, then normative cannot be synonymous with force for 
good” (Diez 2005, p. 29).  
As sum, criticisms and concerns mostly directed to legitimization of the EU’s 
chosen norms, as Aggestam argues, presently the EU needs to ‘focus on the 
ethical dilemmas involved in choosing either the military or civilian instruments 
in foreign policy; that is, on the justifications behind the exercise of power’ (2008, 
p. 3). In other words, “deficiency in the normative power debate is the existence 
of a set of objective standards against which the EU’s norms could be judged” 
(Whitman 2011, p. 30). Aggestam (2008) indicated that “a charge often levelled at 
academics who seek to evaluate the EU’s international role is that they fail to 
agree on a set of explicit methodological rules by which to analyse EU foreign 
and security policy”, as a result, “they run the risk of simply confirming political, 
subjective assumptions, rather than opening up their analyses to the possibility 
that their findings can be refuted by empirical evidence” (Aggestam 2008, p. 5) 
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6 Russia Towards New Realism  
6.1 Multidimensional Approach 
The central objective for this part of study is to investigate the current stage of the 
Russian-European relations and provide argumentations for formulating the 
façade of Russia as normative power in relations with the Union apart from 
energy cooperation. According to Richard Sakwa after fall of the Soviets, world 
politics has been changed, ‘bipolar world has given way to a more concentric 
version that lies at the basis of the post-communist neo-imperial approach’ (2009, 
p. 5). Russia moved from periphery to the core in the world politics and started 
playing an essential role in global governance. Russia improved relations with the 
NATO and the EU but unsolved problems still remained in the country such as 
economic problems, corruption, criminality, etc. 
After collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia emerged as another major 
international actor of world politics. During these two decades Russian Federation 
has undergone major restructuring in its domestic and foreign policy, especially 
after Vladimir Putin’s first term. Putin in his speech in December 1999 set out the 
broad direction which prioritized “the establishment of internal stability and, in 
the process, rekindle national pride and identity at and abroad4”. During the first 
term of the presidency not only he brought changes to Russian political route but 
also he became one of the most recognized political faces in world politics and 
achieved almost his core objectives where, Russian economy has recovered from 
1998’s shock and living standards improvements became much more visible (in 
comparison with the former government). As sum, in political arena, Russia 
rediscovered its voice and started playing a significant role in formation of the 
international agenda. Putin has made considerable progress in establishing Russia 
as a 'normal’ state (Gover and Timmins 2009). In their words, “Russia's [internal] 
recovery and international influence has been based very much on its energy 
resources and the much-needed revenue provided rather than broadly based 
economic growth” (2009, p. XXII). The changes formulated a new outlook of 
Russian politics and economics that Kanet named as ‘hybrid’ and to him it 
‘combines aspects of electoral democracy with top-down management of both the 
political and the economic system’ (Kanet 2010, p. 1) 
After reforms, most prominent scholars named Russia in the power 
characterization by different titles or terms such as ‘great power’, “normal 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
4 Vladimir Putin, Russia at the Turn of the Millennium Speech, 31 December 1999, available with translation at: 
http://www.government.gov.ru/english/statVP_engl_l.html, (accessed 25.03.2012) 
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power”, ‘normative power’, ‘superpower’ and ‘regional power’, etc. There are a 
number of other power characterizations which can be easily appropriated to 
Russia such as nuclear power, military power, etc. In that sense, Derek Avvere 
characterized Russia as a power, where the governing elite and the majority of 
political elites certainly believe that ‘Russia is a fully-fledged normal great power, 
playing a substantive global role and being the main regional power willing and 
capable of acting a security and development provider’, increasingly in recent 
years, this has involved a role as a normative power (Interview 1). Tatiana 
Romonova added that, Russia can be identified as normal and also normative 
power, because two concepts don’t exclude each other (Interview 2). As it was 
clearly indicated in Vladimir Putin’s speech as well and was stated that: 
“The only realistic choice for Russia is the choice to be a strong country, strong and 
confident in its strength, strong not in spite of the world community, not against other 
strong states, but together with them.” (Vladimir Putin, state-of the-federation speech, 8 
July 2000) 
President Vladimir Putin’s first and foremost purpose in his first term (2000) 
was on the base of the normalization of Russia’s foreign policy. During those 
years, Russia couldn’t be considered as ‘normal’ great or ‘normative power, 
because of domestic problems. Government was mostly in charge of stabilizing 
internal conflicts (i.e. the Second Chechen War). By Putin’s successful attempts 
internal conflicts has been solved  and by pursed policy the state achieved 
remarkably quick and effective results in different fields. Russia stands in the 
same line with the other world powers, most considerable example is second Iraq 
war (2003) where Russia also treated as other countries but afterwards shift in 
pursed global regional policy became very obvious. In 2000s Vladimir Putin 
signed a new edition of Russia’s very important major security documents (i.e. 
National Security Concept, the Military Doctrine and the Foreign Policy Concept 
- See appendix 1, the main entries of the security documents of 2003, 2007 and 
2008). The list of documents is as follows: 
 
Table 3: Chronology of Putin’s major security documents and statements (2000–
2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Haas 2010, p. 15 
After 1993 the Foreign Policy Concept was the first document that brought 
normalization towards Russia’s foreign policy. As indicated in the document 
certain tendencies of international politics compelled that Russia altered and 
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revised its foreign and security policy. Furthermore, Haas stated regarding the 
main principle of Russian foreign policy that ‘the RF was a great power, that 
Russia’s influence in international politics was to be strengthened and that 
political, military and economic cooperation and integration…’ (2010, p. 17). 
Majority of the security documents signed in 2000 were an assertive attitude 
towards the West. Briefly 2000s’ Security Papers displayed negative attitude 
towards Western security policy papers. As clear an example for this is that 
NATO used force towards Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Kosovo) and not only ignored 
Russian security policy but also disregarded the UN and the standards of 
international law. During Vladimir Putin’s second term (March 2004), the regime, 
the condition of the democracy and its level became more salient issue and was 
criticized by the West. 
Under Putin’s foreign policy state policy changed its routes towards new 
realism and as Sakwa (2009) stated, “new realism has not given up the notion of 
Russia as a great power, but the definition of what it means to be a great power 
has changed as well as die way it should behave” (2009, p. 7). Vladimir Putin 
dedicated considerable attention to the state’s image abroad and improved and 
resorted international prestige and also particular attention was paid to keeping 
Russian role over Commonwealth Independent States (CIS). Certainly, after 
bigbang enlargement of the Union, CIS considered the Russian Federation as one 
of the important regions and areas of interest. 
Subsequently, I would like to note that Vladimir Putin’s implemented policy 
reforms were concluded by Richard Sakwa (2009) as the fact that Russia push 
passed to new realism in the Foreign Policy and characterized this by following 
seven key features. First, he identified as economization of foreign policy, on 26 
January, 2001 Vladimir Putin’s keynote speech at the foreign ministry, he stressed 
that ‘Russia’s strategic aim was integration into the world community, and for this 
the priority task of Russian diplomacy was the promotion of Russia's economic 
interests abroad’ and also in September, 2002 during meeting with staff of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Russian) he insisted that ‘advancing Russia's 
business interests was equal to traditional political reporting’ (2009, p. 8-9). 
Subsequently, the economization became key priority in the Foreign Policy under 
Putin’s government. 
The second key feature of Putin’s foreign policy was Europeanisation. As 
Sakwa explained even during earlier periods of Russian independence, Boris 
Yeltsin’s policy advisor, Gennady Burbulis mentioned that, “…none of the 
problems facing the country could be solved without learning from the European 
experience” and later Putin during his interview mentioned that “We are a part of 
Western European culture, in fact, we derive our worth precisely from this. 
Wherever our people might happen to live - in the Far East or in the South we are 
Europeans” (2009, p. 9). In the first EU-Russian summit in May 2000 Putin also 
insisted that “Russia was, is and will be a European country by its location, its 
culture, and its attitude toward economic integration” and one of other example 
for Europeanization in Russian foreign policy, Putin’s 26 January 2001 speech 
where he indicated, “European direction is traditionally the most important for us” 
(ibid). The Europeanization is a major key feature of Putin’s foreign policy which 
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totally differentiates from Yeltsin’s. President Yeltsin’s pursed policy towards 
West might be considered soft and keeping in distance but Putin’s is closer but 
very tough. 
The third key feature is identified and named as securitization. Sakwa 
highlighted that “security in the post-Cold War era is less about direct threats than 
about the perception of risk, with the concept of risk defined rather more strongly 
than general threats or problems” (2009, p. 9). This mentioned feature was also 
one the major points of foreign policy. The policy towards dealing with the global 
security threat resolutely inside or outside the country became predominate in the 
political manners (Russian policy during the second Chechen War might be a 
good example). 
The shift from alternativity to autonomy is illustrated as fourth, and as 
indicated by Sakwa the “[debates over] multipolar globalism, under Primakov was 
based on the notion of Russia as an alternative pole balancing that of the West, 
and indeed working as a competitive actor in the international system” (2009, p. 
9). Under Putting governance this thinking level has been completely changed and 
Russia became an autonomous actor. In other words, as Igor Ivanov (former 
Foreign Affairs Minister of Russian Federation from 1998 to 2004) stated, ‘Russia 
would defend the idea of a democratic, multi-polar system of international 
relations, and concluded that ‘Russia is by no means looking for a pretext for 
rivalry' (ibid). 
Bilateralism is determined as the fifth aspect of Putin’s reformed foreign 
policy. During his first presidency term, Russia improved its relations with 
multilateral organizations such as the EU, NATO, and UN, state policy based on 
broader international multilateralism (ibid, p. 21). The aforesaid multilateral 
organizations were cooperated with Moscow and tried to amplify Moscow’s 
approach towards the world and also with other organizations (i.e. Organization 
for Security and in Europe) because Cooperation there were several difficulties 
between Russia and OSCE (withdrawal Russian forces from Transdniestria and 
Georgia and also criticizing Russia's conducting in the Chechen war). Bilateralist 
elements were indicated in the below keynote of the Igor Ivanov: 
 “One of the fundamental tenets of Russia's European policy is the expansion of bilateral 
relations with individual countries... Over the past decade, Russia's relations with virtually 
all these countries have been taken to a qualitatively new level. We have become privileged 
partners in our cooperation efforts with such countries as Germany, Great Britain, France, 
Spain and others. We feel this is exceptionally valuable.5” 
The sixth element of new realism, was named constrained great powerism and 
it is in a way was explained that after restoring its status in power relations, Russia 
became a major international power that was accepted to cooperate with the West 
and established a robust relationships with political and economic institutions, as 
in word of the Skawa (2009), “this is conditioned by the shift from alternativity to 
autonomy” (p. 11). Russia became very confident and has started pursuing policy 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
5 Igor S. Ivanov, The New Russian Diplomacy, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2002,  p. 95 
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toward Central Asia and South Caucasus, despite the presence of national interest 
of other powers in the region. 
The final element of the new realism is a combination of all aforementioned 
elements and is named as ‘normalize’ which refers to relations with the West. 
During Putin’s first term he had several attempts to overcome Russian isolations 
and to establish robust relations with the West, particularly with Europe. 
Therefore, during Putin's presidency there was a visible shift towards European 
orientation rather than American. In other words, Foreign Policy Concept of 
Russia (2000) vividly emphasized the importance of the Europe to Russia as “… 
an important resource for Russia's defense of its national interests in European and 
world affairs, and for the stabilization and growth of the Russian economy”. (OFP 
2000, sec. IV Regional Priorities6) 
Herewith, it should be indicated that after mentioned reforms and rediscovery 
of its power, Russia put forward its normativisim and Moscow-Brussels 
partnership became very uneasy and with that confident Russia started normative 
competition (offensive) with Brussels. 
6.2 Russian Normative Inclinations 
The Foreign Policy Concepts (2000 and 2007) 
 
This chapter is mainly focused on the Foreign Policy Concepts (FPC) of the 
Russian Federation for grasping normative power discourse and analysis of 
ratified concepts (overviews). Also in this part author attempt to answer to the 
following question - to what extent Russia became ‘normative offensive’ and/or 
started ‘normative rivalry’. 
Shortly after ratification of the National Security concept in 2000, Russian 
government lead by Vladimir Putin also revisited Military Doctrine and Foreign 
Policy Concept; on 28 June 2000 President Putin signed a new FPC. In the 
preamble of revised document it was indicated that, the tendencies were during 
that period compelled Moscow to review its FPC. According to Haas (2010), the 
basic principle of the mentioned FPC (2000s edition) was to show Russia as great 
power and that it has “… influence in international politics [and] strengthened [in] 
political, military and economic cooperation and integration …” (2010, p. 17).  
Certainly, Russia as always is considered as one the great powers of international 
politics and has the key importance to the European security.  As implied above, 
after Vladimir Putin’s presidency Russia became very ambitious in the region 
mostly in economic, political, security issues and put its own manners, or as 
Oldberg (2010) noted “assertive thanks to its growing economic power and 
concentration of political power, at the same time as changes in the world offered 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
6 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, June 28, 2000, 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm, (accessed 13.04.2012) 
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opportunities that Russia could exploit” (2010, p. 30).  Second overview of 
Foreign Policy (OFP) was approved on 27 March 2007 by Vladimir Putin. 
According to Haas, it was possibly used as foundation or base for Medvedev’s 
Foreign Policy Concept in 2008.  He also put forward five following elements that 
OFP is based on (MID - 2007a - Ministerstvo Innostrannykh Del Rossiyskoy 
Federatsii - Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation):  
 multilateral diplomacy: UN, G8, threats, disarmament and crisis management; 
 geographic directions: CIS, Europe, North America, Asia-Pacific and other regions; 
 economic diplomacy: liberalization of trade, energy diplomacy; 
 humanitarian diplomacy: protection of rights, protection of Russian citizens abroad, 
cultural and scientific cooperation; 
 ensuring foreign policy: diversification of policy instruments, regional cooperation. 
After ratification of OFP, Russia considerably strengthened its position, Haas 
(2010) argued that “…now powerful Russia had become an important element of 
positive changes in the world [and] an important achievement of recent years was 
that Russia had regained its foreign policy independence” (2010, p. 23). First 
(2000) therapy and followed by changes provided an important privileges such as 
over self-confidence and Russia became very independent actor of international 
politics. As an example we can indicate the fact that during formation of the 
independent state of Kosovo, Russia acted independently and did not support 
European attitudes and claimed that it can be a reason of de-stability inside 
Europe. Besides OFP, the other major documents were also revised and by that 
Russia became an active global power that not only participates in realizing the 
international agenda but also formulates this agenda. Therefore, the clamed 
normative power notion or ‘normative offensive’ doubtless stands on documents 
approved during Putin’s presidency, “…documents published during Putin’s 
presidency provide a rendering of the development of Russia” (Haas 2010, p. 34). 
A comparison of Putin’s first term approved document (the 2000 National 
Security Concept, Foreign Policy Concept and Military Doctrine and the 2003 
Defence White Paper) with the second term documents (Overview of Foreign 
Policy 2007 and Strategy 2020 which approved in 2008) offered solid consistent 
developing and new entries. 
Presidency of Dmitrii Medvedev’s as the third President of Russia (2008 to 
2012) contained the same policy path and visibly close cooperation with Putin as 
a Prime Minister. After accession to power, president Medvedev just like Putin 
launched a new Foreign Policy and new National Strategy Concepts (See 
appendix 2, Medvedev’s key security documents compared with those of Putin 
(2000–2009)). They are in the following order:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Haas 2010, p. 83 
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Ingmar Oldberg (2010) identified six main objectives of Medvedev on the 
base of above mentioned documents and they are followings (Kanet 2010, p. 31): 
 Safeguarding the security of the country, strengthening its sovereignty and 
territorial integrity as well as its position as “one of the influential centers in the 
world;” 
 Creating good conditions for Russia’s modernization, raising living standards, 
consolidating society and securing the competiveness of the country; 
 Promoting a “just and democratic world order” based on collective principles and 
the supremacy of international law; 
 Creating good relations with Russia’s neighbors and eliminating hotbeds of 
conflict in the adjoining regions and other parts of the world; 
 Seeking consensus with other states and international organizations; Defending the 
“rights and interests of Russian citizens and compatriots abroad” and promoting 
the Russian language and the cultures of Russia abroad; 
 Creating “an objective perception of Russia in the world as a democratic state” 
with an independent foreign policy. 
Approved concepts are directed to Russia’s state interest and its position in 
international politics and multipolarity callings on paper are vivid attempts against 
the dominance of the United States. External security became priority during 
Medvedev’s presidency and was placed before economic development. Oldberg 
(2010) argued that there is a risk of “conflict between promoting the primary goal 
of strengthening Russia as one of the strong centers in the world and defending 
the Russians abroad on one hand, and territorial integrity and the seeking of 
consensus with other states on the other (ibid, p. 31)”. As a sum it must be noted 
that president Medvedev formulated five short leading principles proclaiming the 
primacy of international law, advocating a multipolar world, expressing interest in 
friendly relations with all states, giving priority to protecting Russians 
everywhere, and talking of regions of ‘privileged interests’ (statements after 
Georgian war, Medvedev, August 31, 2008;  September 2, 2008). 
Therefore, Putin and Medvedev’s FPC provided clarity to the idea that Russia 
became more normative offensive than during Yeltsin’s period. Generally, Putin 
Russia’s earliest policy trajectory has been characterized and usually accepted as 
either fundamentally pragmatic or a realpolitik type. As Makarychev (2008) 
affirmed the analyses of the Putin’s presidency, “surprisingly enough, Russian 
foreign policy discourse became – at least rhetorically - increasingly normative” 
(2008, p. 12). This normative inclination formulated a foundation to Moscow not 
only to accept normative challenges put down by Brussels’s but also start 
“politically counter-attack in the normative battlefield” (ibid).  
The most visible normative reaction from Moscow was put forward during 
‘color revolutions’ in Georgia and Ukraine and as Makarychev (2008) indicated 
State duma had a statement (October 2,  2007)  proclaiming that new government 
in Georgia is “violating the principles of democracy and abusing human rights, 
including tightening control over opposition, the media and dissidents” (p. 12). On 
the other hand, regarding the case with the Ukraine Russia put forward a key 
normative argument referring to, “the security decisions taken without due 
account of public opinion as ‘non-democratic’ action” (ibid). By that statement, 
the State Duma reflected, the application of the Ukraine to the NATO. One of the 
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other well-matched examples of Russian normativity is the creation of the 
Institute of Democracy and Cooperation (IDC) with two headquarters (Paris and 
New York) since 2008. Makarychev (2008) entitled it as a “new in the tradition of 
Russian foreign policy” (p. 12). The creation of this Institute might be interpreted 
as a direct response to the European and American foundations’ activities in 
Russia and as stated by, the key member of a Kremlin-created civic organization, 
Public Chamber and founder of the Institute of Democracy and Cooperation 
Anatoly Kucherena “We're not just planning to criticize the West” (Chicago 
Tribune7, March 27, 2008). 
Russia’s key normative approach of discussion is widely debated and should 
be discussed from the following perspectives. On one hand some scholars 
defended Russian normativism and on the other hand, some of them indicated that 
invasion of Georgia (2008, Russo-Georgian War, also known in Russia as the 
Five-Day War) was the end of the Russian normativism. For instance, Averre 
touched upon case more broadly and put forward Russian normative approach by 
following statement “at the international level, Russia is a firm advocate of an 
international system made up of strong sovereign states, with the primary locus of 
decision-making being in the UN Security Council and the main principles rooted 
in state sovereignty, territorial integrity, equality among states, indivisible security 
and peaceful resolution of disputes by the international community” (Interview 1). 
On the other hand, Romonova argued on Russian normativisim by discussing one 
of the present cases and stated that “… look to Syria case, Russia is a normative 
power; Russia is trying to be a normative power” (Interview 2) and finalized that 
“… any country which considered ‘power’ tires to lay normative foundation in its 
actions” (ibid). 
Accordingly, Makarychev (2008) discussed political logic of the Russia’s 
normative offensive foreign policy and provided three modalities. First he 
indicated that, Russia has always been admitted to a certain degree of “political 
decisionism in a normative type of foreign policy” (p. 13). The argumentation 
splits into twofold, the first perspective as Makarychev pointed out is ‘in the likely 
cases of collision between different norms it is a political decision that prioritizes 
one over another’ (ibid). As an example, for the Kosovo case, Putin admitted that 
there might be ‘a conflict between the two constitutive principles of international 
society - territorial integrity vs. peoples’ right to self-determination’ (ibid). As 
result, according to him the first constitutive principle has to prevail. Second 
aspect is that some cases norms or decisions (solutions) used in one case might be 
irrelevant to others, even if the cases are very similar. As continuation of the 
Kosovo case, Russian side argued that, “global politics are defined not by shared 
rules of the game but rather by sovereign decisions on the part of the pivotal 
actors …” and Makarychev concluded that the European Union and the United 
States tends to act in ‘decisionist way’ (ibid). Secondly, as defined the effects of 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
7 Citing U.S. hypocrisy on rights, Russia takes lectern, Chicago Tribune , March 27, 2008, available at 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-03-27/news/0803260749_1_human-rights-kremlin-backed-human-
rights-watch (accessed 16.04.2012) 
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norms is the perspective of “exclusion looming large behind their 
implementation” (ibid). Subsequently, presupposes of normativity is an ‘interplay 
between inclusion and exclusion: certain norms are referred to as ‘constitutive’, 
while others are ignored or marginalized’ (ibid). Finally, the normative 
international policy behaviour always leaves behind ‘normative disagreements’, in 
other words, as indicated by Makarychev “contestation and re-definition of key 
normative signifiers” (2008, p. 14). 
Therefore, after re-formation of the Russian foreign policy concept normative 
elements and behaviors became very visible and as Makarychev finalized, “ [the] 
Russia’s newborn normative zeal is a crucial tool in her attempts to be accepted as 
a legitimate and constitutive member of the international community which, by 
and large, might be equated with the West” (2008, p. 17). Russia is always trying 
to be recognized as an equal partner in the Europe for norm-setting. Makarychev 
stated that this attempt or ambition of the Russian Federation not should be 
understood as if Russia is trying to possess its ‘own’ norms. Subsequently, the 
Russian Federation is trying to lay a normative foundation for its actions, ‘Russia 
seems to be ready to offer an alternative reading of a set of norms constitutive of 
European identity…’ (ibid).  But, definitely it doesn’t means that to substitute 
those norms or values with some kind of ‘Russian’ ones. 
The criticism of the Russian normativisim is discussed by Prozorov and as 
stated by him, 'Russia does not have a strongly normative orientation either in 
domestic or foreign policy, opting instead for opportunistic ‘pragmatism’” 
(Interview 3). He also added that the one normative approach that Russia 
defended with some consistency from early 1990s until 2008 was the principle of 
state sovereignty and the consequent imperative of non-intervention in domestic 
conflicts. Therefore, after invasion of Georgia this ‘normative principle may no 
longer be invoked with any consistency, further diminishing the normative 
component of Russian foreign policy’ (ibid). 
6.3 The Northern Dimension 
Russia has displayed its normative foreign policy by participation in a series of 
trans-border initiatives and the Northern Dimension (ND) considered one of the 
most important. The Northern Dimension, adopted by the EU in 1998 and its 
policy was drawn up in 1999, aiming to promote economic development stability 
and security in the Northern Europe among four partners: the European Union, 
Norway, Iceland and the Russian Federation. The initiative is mainly addressed to 
cross-border issues and is a way to “contribute to narrowing disparities in living 
standards, ward off threats originating in the region and contribute to reducing 
environmental and nuclear threat” (White and Light 2009, p. 49).  According to 
authors’ the Union and the initiative partners cooperate in dealing with these 
issues “by drawing on existing regional policies and financial instruments and 
specifically reinforcing positive interdependence between Russia and the Baltic 
Sea region and the European Union” (ibid). The initiative alleviated many 
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problems that occurred after the fall of the Soviet Union in the Northern Russia. 
The economic, ecological and governance problems of Kaliningrad region were 
covered in the scope of the programme. Herewith, according to liberal deputy 
Vladimir Ryzhkov, “it has turned increasingly into a declaratory programme, and 
today, as before, it is difficult to discern any concrete results” (White and Light 
2009, p. 50).  
By involving trans-border cooperation with Europe, Russian government put 
forward its normative basis. Of course, one cannot discard Russia’s economic 
interest in trans-border cooperation, but self-confidence and being an independent 
actor in the world politics provided Russian government to act normatively. On 
one hand, being a member of the international border initiatives became an 
important element for Russia in the path to Europeanisation. According to 
Makarychev, “Russia has committed itself to strengthening institutions in this 
shared neighborhood through a variety of initiatives aimed at promoting mutual 
confidence and human exchange” (2008, p. 4). On the other hand, as Arunitov 
stressed (2000), the ND was as an excellent opportunity for the Russia to join 
‘democratic space’ where the main values are human rights, the protection of 
minorities and a healthy environment (p. 259). 
Within two decades Russia concluded a set of cooperative agreements with the 
European Union and started pursuing normative foreign policy in its trans-border 
cooperation. The political values driven from ND considered as “transparency, 
egalitarianism, and consensual democracy” (Schumacher 2000, p. 11). At the 
beginning of 2001 Russia approved the Concept of the Trans-Border cooperation. 
In 2002, the State Duma ratified the European Framework Convention on Trans-
Border Cooperation. Thereafter, these legal frameworks, Russia enrolled a variety 
of trans-border organizations for state-to-state interaction. For instance we can 
show the Council on Cooperation of Border Regions (CCBR), the Barents Euro-
Arctic Council (BEAC) and the Committee for Spatial Development in the Baltic 
Sea Region (CSD/BSR). Institutional mechanisms also included Arctic Council, a 
high-level intergovernmental forum. By participating in these initiatives Russia’s 
policies shifted from “realpolitik, semi-isolationism and unilateralism to 
multilateral cooperation” (Makarychev 2008, p. 5).  
The Northern Dimensions has following problems that should be discussed. 
On one hand, the ND doesn’t have a specific budget but according to White and 
Light (2009), the ND intended to “…serve as an umbrella to ensure 
complementarily and coordination between existing regional initiatives” (2009, 
p.49). Being an independent player Russia has equal contribution to ND and often 
puts forward normative foreign policy discussions. The second problem of ND 
according to the authors’ is “revolving presidency of the EU as the Northern 
Dimension receives more attention when , a North European member state holds 
EU presidency and less when the presidency moves on alter six months” (2009, 
p.50). After presidency of Putin Russian government contributed to the 
ineffectiveness of the ND. The first term of Vladimir Putin’s presidency coincides 
with the adoption of the first action plan of the initiative. Assisting in solving the 
ineffectiveness ND also can be considered another factor by means of which 
Russia tries to show its normativisim. 
 42 
 
Inside of the initiative partners reacts in some cases very normatively, 
especially between European Union and Russian Federation. Russia acted 
normatively in several spheres of trans-border relations with the European Union. 
From the perspective of security as indicated by the Makarychev “the trans- 
border cooperation altered the balance of priorities between hard and soft security 
issues …” (2008, p. 6). 
Makarychev (2008) divided and explained Russia’s normative foreign policy 
in trans-border with the EU into following contexts. Initially defined as normative 
foreign policy in trans-border cooperation, it actually is “interplay between 
different levels of government of Russian” (ibid). There are two approaches that 
collided in Russia’s trans-border relations. According to the author the first 
approach was very dominate in 1990s which was based on “the interpretation of 
Russia’s European choice as a policy of re-building Russian domestic rules under 
the influence of EU trans-border programmes” (Makarychev 2008, p. 7). 
Consequently for the core partners border relations provide incentives rather than 
posing threats, certainly finding liberal solutions for border territories became 
very normatively discussable between sides. The second collided approach is 
considered to be the ‘conservative approach’. Russian Federal Security Service 
(FSB - Federal'naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti) issued that ‘The Rules of Border 
Regime’ which reflect conservative essence. By issuing mentioned document 
Russian government has changed and complicated procures for entering Russian 
border areas. According to Makarychev (2008) by collision of these approaches 
Russian government has failed to elaborate a vivid a set of policy instrument 
towards trans-border regions, and he also determined that complicated procedures 
are considered as a part of normative foreign policy of Russia towards Baltic and 
Northern regions as well as the European Union. 
Therefore, the last important factor for explaining the Russian normative 
policy in trans-border regions is defined as an external environment. Makarychev 
(2008) argued that “a strong normative pull from the EU coupled with internally 
divided Russian approaches to border regions balanced against weak internal 
capabilities, leading to an overall normative result”. The Union was very effective 
in trans-border cooperation that “sees the involvement of a variety of regional 
governing agencies open to external influences” (Friis and Murphy 1998, p. 16). 
Subsequently, the case study provides several approaches that are considered 
essential grounding for explanation of the normative inclination of the Russian 
foreign policy. Most Russian authors (Makarychev, 2008; Tsygankov, 2005) 
affirms that Russia besides multilateral cooperation with Union, pursed foreign 
policy at least rhetorically increasingly normative. 
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7 Conclusion 
 
One of the main objectives of the study was to examine Russia and the EU as 
normative powers in the region apart from the current energy relations. In case of 
energy, the current mutual interdependence provides a foundation for building a 
solid partnership despite sides’ mutual disappointments. By underlining 
differences and comparing the Russian Federation with the European Union in the 
same horizon as normative powers is not a very easy task, due to the lack of 
empirical data. 
The enlargements of NATO and the EU have inevitably had a strong negative 
impact on the geopolitics of the region and this lead to detailed review of Russian 
reforms since 2000s and Foreign Policy Concepts in chapter five that provided an 
important foundation for the idea that current Russian’s political trajectory is 
normative offensive in most major relations with the West. Perhaps, it is 
considered as one of the main negative factors for Europe to share its values and 
balance its own interests in the region. According to the study, developing 
normative partnership between sides has become impossible due to insufficient set 
of shared norms and values. One of the main outputs of this study is fact that 
Russia and Europe are not enthusiastic to make it possible because both sides 
have their own realities and very different approaches over the major cases. Both 
sides continue preferring following current institutionalized strategic partnership. 
As mentioned preliminarily Russia and the EU have achieved cooperation over 
the past two decades, but still there are mutual disappointments. Thus, from the 
EU’s perspective one of the biggest disappointments has been the fact that after 
2000s Russia chose a wrong way for developing and the path selected by Russia 
was against the EU’s hopes. In recent years the political and economic reforms 
affirmed that Russia is trying to build up its own model rather than to follow 
European. Also, there is very less enthusiasm over the legal approximation 
process. The model that has been formulated by Russia (since 2000s) has its own 
normative approach that resulted in new bounds and very tough negotiations with 
the Union. According to Averre (2007) in relations with the EU, Russia promotes 
its own normative agenda. Not surprisingly, under Vladimir Putin’s government 
new approach appeared towards cases where the values driven by Moscow are 
against to the European type of leadership and governing. 
The discussion of the Europe Normative Power projection elucidated different 
perspectives of the EU’s external relations. The EU’s norm-driven behavior in its 
external relations and last decade the Russian normative inclination put forward 
discussion of the normative contention between sides in the region. The one of the 
main findings is that since 2000s i.e. the presidency of Vladimir Putin, foreign 
policy and state political trajectory of the Russian Federation has changed 
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radically. Those changes are considered as the main base and limelight of this 
study. Accordingly after stabilizing economy and solving internal problems, the 
President Putin paid major attention to state pursued foreign policy for restoring 
their role in global governance. As mentioned in the previous chapter, under 
Putin’s governance the state foreign policy changed its routes towards new 
realism. The new realism elements derived from Russia’s revised foreign policy 
concepts (2000 and 2007) are considered the followings: economization, 
europeanisation, and securitization, the shift from alternativity to autonomy, 
bilateralism, great powerism and generally normalization state policy. Besides 
those elements, President Putin’s pursued state foreign policy discourse on the 
base of those above mentioned factors became at least rhetorically very normative 
and it should be considered as another major element of Russian’s new realism 
that finds its justification in recently ratified documents. According to the most 
careful analysis that has so far been conducted in this study, this normative 
inclinations determined new bounds for the EU-Russian relations. This new born 
normative zeal put forward by Moscow is characterized Russia’s return to global 
governance with very immense ambitions and being a self-styled energy 
superpower provided an excellent opportunity to lay normative foundation to 
pursed foreign policy. 
After often chaotic years of Boris Yeltsin’s presidency the Putin era has been 
characterized with its stability and during these years by restoring its global 
prestige Moscow put forward its strong ambitions to be active in global 
governance not only by participating in realizing the international agenda but also 
in formulating this agenda. Particularly during Putin’s presidency, Russia 
reoriented the agenda of the EU-Russian relations to very tough debates. In other 
words, according to Derek Averre the notable development in the EU-Russian 
relationships in recent years has been a move away from the idea of “Russia as a 
‘norm-taker’ to be ‘instructed’ by the EU, towards being a ‘norm-maker’, 
especially in the post-Soviet space” (Interview 1).  
Backing to selected case study outputs, the Northern Dimension was one of 
the excellent opportunities to enhance the cooperation between the EU and Russia 
on different issues such as energy, environment, etc. Nonetheless, the EU’s 
Normative Power projections and its very fast enlargement established new 
bounds in trans-border cooperation as well. Moscow’s reactions and pursued 
foreign policy put forward the discussion of Russia trying to lay a normative 
foundation in trans-border cooperation at the same level as they formulated it in 
energy relations with the Union. Finally, the Northern Dimension initiative case 
also provided an output that Russia returned to global governance not just as a 
great power or energy superpower of the region and at the same time in the world 
politics but also is trying to be very normative in relations with the West apart 
from energy relations. 
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Executive summary 
I Research Problem and Aim of the Study 
Generally, the relationships between Russia and the EU were the most researched 
and approached topic over the last decades. Since years, the normative discussions 
have been considered as one of the important parts of the Russia-EU relations. 
Besides, Russia and the EU have achieved to cooperate almost the past two 
decades under this difficult condition. After 2000s, the conditions totally changed, 
due to the fact that political trajectory of Russia and pursued policy towards West 
was reshaped and new foundation prepared for the Russian-European relations 
after Valdimir Putin accessed the power. 
After a number of chaotic years of president Yeltsin’s government Putin 
brought new era to the Russian Federation. Moreover, during Boris Yeltsin’s 
period Russian Federation political orientation was not characterized normative 
offensive towards the West. Certainly, those years are characterized by internal 
instability such as the Chechen Wars (First Chechen War - December 1994 to 
August 1996 and Second Chechen War - August 1999 to May 2000) and other 
major economic issues. This thesis is aiming to study Russian Federation’s new 
era by discussing political and economic reforms that helped to restore Russia’s 
internal stability and as well as state its prestige worldwide after the fall of the 
Soviets.  
II Scope of the Study 
After analyzing several concepts and overviews of the Russian Federation’s (the 
2000 National Security Concept, Foreign Policy Concept and Military Doctrine 
and the 2003 Defence White Paper) ratified under Putin’s government since 
2000s, I have become very enthusiastic to study profound state of the new 
reformed foreign policy towards the Europe. On the other hand, it was very 
interesting to research Russian alternative and reactions to the Normative Power 
Europe (NPE) projection. Furthermore, the idea of studying partial derived from 
mine NPE projection research. The research shed light on different aspects of 
NPE projection including Union’s norms and values as well as its spreading 
mechanism. Inspired from that study I decided to analyze normative contention 
between Russia and the Europe apart from the existing energy relations. Why to 
neglect current energy relations? By ignoring energy relations I tried to find out 
the Russian normative approaches in different fields of the current relations. 
Admittedly, the Russian Federation is considered as an energy superpower of the 
world and can easily be determined as a normative power in the field.  In other 
words this research concentrates on defining Russia as Normative power by 
neglecting its existing energy relations. Particularly, under Putin’s governance 
Russia became very normative offensive and Moscow started pursuing normative 
foreign policy towards the West that aimed to be active participation in the global 
governance.   
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III Methodology 
To carry out this research, qualitative research design and its appropriate data 
collection methods were utilized.  Qualitative research design provided foundation 
for the examining Russian-EU relations in scope of normative contention. Chosen 
research design provided as well as grounding to put EU-Russia in the same line 
for discussing their in scope normative powers (see 4.1). 
During data collection period, due the lack of empirical data on Russian 
normativisim, expert in-depth interview has been selected and realized. Three 
prominent Russian studies scholars interviewed by relevant qualitative expert 
interview methods (see 4.2). During study period, the feedbacks of experts 
transcribed and deeply analyzed. Thus, analyzed feedbacks provided the main 
foundation for discussing normative contention from different perspectives. The 
logic behind selection of three different experts is, to avoid being biased on 
normativisim discussion and also these interviews provided an opportunity to 
manage scope of this study. The interviews realized with internet-based 
qualitative interview methods. Accordingly, organized in-depth expert interviews 
through internet realized in a followings ways: Two of them were on the base of 
email and one of them implemented via an instant messenger. Questions that 
experts replied almost overlapped but only via an instant messenger the scope was 
very broad. The diversity of feedbacks provided fruitful results to this study. 
Examining EU and Russian normativisim: In this study, for examining EU and 
Russian normativisim in the trans-border cooperation, the Northern Dimensions 
initiative was selected as a single case study (see 6.3). Defining Russian 
normativisim apart current energy relations, this case study provided solid 
foundation to explore Russian Federation’s changed foreign policy and its 
enhanced scope. The case study enabled to diverse perspective of the Russian 
pursued foreign policy (see 6.1).   
    Furthermore, to operationalization of this study following variables selected: 
powerism, normativism, and institutionalized relationship. On one hand, the 
analyses consist of initially to define global governance and Normative Power 
Europe which are considered one the main foundations of the powerism (see 6.2). 
On the other hand, analyses of the Russian political transformations (2000-2008) 
that are considered as starting point for normative contention.  
IV Theoretical Framework 
This study considered the institutionalism approach as theoretical lens of study. 
The selected theoretical framework provided grounding to understand the main 
institutional structure of the Russia and European Union relations. As according 
this chapter current relationship between sides is on the base of a well-established 
institutional structure where this environment provides grounding for discussing 
global levels problems. The applied format for the strategic cooperation mostly 
base on Summits (see 3.1). 
 47 
 
Accordingly, new institutionalism emphasizes the importance of formal 
institutions in facilitating cooperation. The starting point of the institutionalized 
EU-Russian relations is coming through the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA) which signed 1994 and came into force 1995. The PCA sets 
principles of the established the institutional framework for bilateral cooperation 
and dialogue in a number of areas.    
On the other hand, the new institutionalism is a main theoretical perspective 
that provides a tool for analyzing European integration. Normative 
institutionalism is a sub-field of the new institutionalism and considered as one of 
the main theoretical frameworks of EU decision-making on foreign policy (see 
5.1). This theory shed lights to European Union’s substantive and procedural 
norms, which provided foundation to negotiate on divergent policy preferences 
(see 5.2). 
V Empirical material 
The empirical material divided into following parts. The first part is an outline of 
the global governance and the defining power and its typology as well as 
conceptualizations of normative power as found its basis mainly from prominent 
scholars’ writings which dedicated over the themes during years. The second part 
present Normative Power Europe discussion and its substantive normative 
principles as found its basis Union’s treaties (i.e. European Economic Community 
of 1957, also known as the Treaty of Rome and Treaty on European Union of 
1993 (TEU)) and also in other Union’s relevant declarations and documents.  
VI Conclusion 
One of the main finding of this study is that after normalization of Russia’s state 
internal policy, under President Valdimir Putin state foreign policy also reformed 
and by this revision Russia put forward its normative ambitions to Europe in all 
major fields. Since the fall of the Soviets the value gab between Russia and 
Europe sides became very clear but after 2000s Vladimir Putin presidency the 
value gap began very widen. Not surprisingly, normative cooperation between 
sides became impossible because there too many uncertainties and future potential 
conflict of interest which undermine this hopes. Taking into consideration current 
Russian normative ambitions the Moscow seems is ready to offer an alternative 
reading of a set of norms constitutive of European identity. 
Although after last bigbang enlargement of the EU have had a huge impact 
towards the region geopolitics where potential conflict of interest is inevitably. 
Those changes compelled Moscow to revise and reform state policy document. 
Subsequently, the Northern Dimensions case bring clarity that Russia is retuned 
back to world politics not only as one of great powers or superpower in energy 
relations but also considered as a normative power in all major cooperation with 
the EU. Despite, that Russian normativisim, the future perspective of the current 
relations will continue only in strategic partnership mode.   
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9 Appendices  
Appendix 1:  
 
The main entries of the Russian Federation security documents of 2003, 2007 and 2008  
Themes 
Defence White Paper 
October 2003 
Overiew of Foreign Policy 
March 2007 
Strategy towards 2020  
February 2008 
Russia in the world community 
Destabilizing 
factors for the 
military-political 
situation 
 The current stage of global 
development is noted for acute 
socio- economic conflicts and 
political contradictions 
 Security is shifting from questions 
of war and peace to complicated 
political, financial-economic, 
ethnic-national, demographic and 
other problems 
 The significance of military power 
in the post-bipolar world has not 
diminished, since a number of 
international security institutions 
are in grave crisis 
 Russia has regained a balance of power 
and competitive international position 
lost after the Cold War 
 Force as a factor to solve international 
problems has increased 
 Focus on disarmament has dropped 
 Attempts to form a unipolar world 
 Victory in the Cold War’ results in 
unilateral responses 
 Continuous enlargement with new 
members is aimed at broadening 
Western influence 
 Iraq has demonstrated the myth of a 
unipolar world 
 The US withdrawal of the ABM Treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Under the pretext of liberty 
and open society the 
sovereignty of states and 
complete regions is destroyed 
 A fierce battle is taking place 
on energy resources. Many 
armed conflicts carry the 
smell of oil and gas 
 There is a growing interest by 
the outside world in Russia 
and Central Asia because of 
their energy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
continued 
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Themes 
Defence White Paper 
October 2003 
Overiew of Foreign Policy 
March 2007 
Strategy towards 2020  
February 2008 
Russia’s national interests 
International  Strengthening of the Russian armed 
forces may prevent the final 
dissolution of the system of 
international relations, based upon 
international law 
 The Russian armed forces can 
ensure global stability 
 An important achievement of recent 
years is that Russia has reinstalled its 
foreign policy independence 
 Russia as an active global power not 
only participates in realizing the 
international agenda but also formulates 
this agenda 
 Energy diplomacy is gaining weight due 
to Russia’s leading role in it 
 The energy factor is increasing in 
Russia’s foreign policy 
 Relations with the CIS countries are a 
key priority in RF foreign policy 
 Russia has an interest in having 
friendly, flourishing, democratic and 
stable states at its borders 
 Russia does not intend to give up its 
natural competitive advantages nor to 
damage its national interests 
 Russia conducts an active policy 
towards the millions of ethnic Russians 
living in the near abroad (za rubezhëm). 
Protection of their interests and 
encouragement to resettle in Russia are 
priorities of RF foreign policy 
 Russia should expand its current 
economic cooperation in the BRIC 
format (Brazil, Russia, India and China) 
with energy and counterterrorism 
 The expenditures for new 
weapon systems must be in 
line with the possibilities and 
not contrary to the priorities 
of the social–economic 
development 
 Strengthening of national 
security demands a new 
strategy towards 2020 for the 
build-up of the armed forces 
 Russia has an active interest 
in global and regional 
integration processes 
 For the accomplishment of its 
national tasks Russia strives 
towards peaceful and positive 
stance of international 
relations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
continued 
 55 
 
Threats to Russia’s security 
External threats  International terrorism 
 Drug trafficking 
 Organized and cross-border crime 
 Deployment of foreign troops in the 
territory of new NATO members 
and states aspiring to join the bloc 
 Unilateral use of military power 
without UNSC mandate 
 Armed force used by ad hoc 
coalitions 
 Cold war stereotypes 
 Proliferation of mass destruction 
weapons 
 Armed force is increasingly used 
for protecting economic interests, 
which enlarges foreign policy 
requirements for using violence 
 Reducing the role of the UNSC is a 
dangerous tendency 
 Renationalization of security policy 
of states in Central Asia, the Far 
East or elsewhere in the CIS will 
compel Russia to consider the 
regions as potential sources of 
conflict 
 Interference in internal RF affairs 
 Demonstration of military power 
close to the borders of Russia 
 Expansion of military blocs 
 Strengthening of Islamic extremism 
close to Russian borders 
 Infringement on the rights and 
interests of Russian citizens in 
foreign states (za rubezhëm) 
 
 International terrorism 
 Extremism 
 Narcotics 
 Regional conflicts 
 Independence of Kosovo would cause a 
serious deterioration of stability in 
Europe and would serve as a precedent 
 Georgia intends destroying the existing 
peacekeeping and negotiating formats 
complicating the situation around 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
 On Afghanistan, a failure and 
subsequent withdrawal of the USA and 
NATO would confront the Central 
Asian states and Russia with the Afghan 
threats of narcotics, terrorism, 
fundamentalism and destabilization 
 The USA and other Western states try to 
use the OSCE as an unilateral 
instrument for ensuring their foreign 
and security policy objectives 
 NATO’s refusal to sign the adapted 
CFE Treaty, further enlargement, 
possibly including Ukraine and Georgia, 
as well as the deployment of US troops 
in Romania and Bulgaria deteriorate the 
relations with Russia 
 The planned US missile defence shield 
in Eastern Europe 
 A new arms race is unfolding, 
caused especially by 
developed states, leaning on 
their technological superiority 
 NATO refuses to sign the 
adapted CFE Treaty, but 
demands from Russia a one-
sided compliance 
 NATO further enlarges, 
taking its military 
infrastructure towards 
Russia’s borders 
 The USA is establishing new 
military bases in Romania 
and Bulgaria and a missile 
defence shield in Poland and 
the Czech Republic 
 Because of the abundance in 
energy resources Russia is 
faced with a recidivist policy 
of deterrence resulting in 
unfair competition, as well as 
with actors that try to get 
access to Russia’s energy 
reserves 
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Appendix 1: continued 
Themes 
Defence White Paper 
October 2003 
Overiew of Foreign Policy 
March 2007 
Strategy towards 2020 
February 2008 
Ensuring Russia’s Security 
Fundamental and 
objectives 
 Nuclear and large-scale wars with 
NATO or other US-led coalitions 
are no longer probable 
 Russia expects cooperation with the 
USA and other industrialized 
countries to grow in ensuring 
stability and dismantling the Cold 
War vestiges 
 Multilateral diplomacy is the 
fundamental method of regulating 
international relations 
 Russia as an active global power not 
only participates in realizing the 
international agenda but also formulates 
this agenda 
 Russia is back in the 
international arena as a 
powerful state, which has to 
be taken into account and 
which can stand up for itself 
Foreign policy 
objectives 
 NATO–Russia partnership is 
maintained despite major 
differences on issues of 
enlargement of the alliance and its 
foreign military operations 
 The main international obligations 
of Russia are related to the UN, the 
CSTO, the SCO and Belarus 
 Russia expects that the anti-Russian 
entries will be removed from 
military planning and political 
declarations of NATO members 
 Economic relations with EU 
countries will further develop 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The EU is Russia’s principal partner in 
Europe 
 Russia expects two-way politics from 
European actors, such as the EU, the 
Council of Europe, the OSCE and 
NATO 
 The relationship with China and the 
cooperation in the triangle Russia– 
India–China are vital policy points 
 Russia conducts an active policy 
towards ethnic Russians living in the 
near abroad (za rubezhëm) 
Not mentioned 
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Ensuring military 
security 
 If NATO is preserved as a military 
alliance with an offensive doctrine, 
cardinal changes will be undertaken 
in Russia’s military planning and 
development of the Russian armed 
forces, including its nuclear 
strategy 
 Russian armed forces will contain 
military and political threats 
 Russian armed forces will ensure 
Russia’s economic and political 
interests and its territorial integrity 
 Ensuring the security of Russian 
citizens in armed conflicts and 
situations of instability 
 Fight against international 
terrorism, political extremism and 
separatism 
 Preservation of a strategic 
deterrence force potential aimed at 
preventing power politics or 
aggression against Russia and allies 
 Russia promotes international peace 
through the UN and regional 
organizations such as OSCE, CSTO, 
CIS and SCO 
 CSTO and SCO can play a positive role 
in the fight against narcotics and terror 
and in promoting stabilization around 
Afghanistan and in Central Asia on the 
whole 
 Russia repeatedly offers NATO 
cooperation with the CSTO around 
Afghanistan. NATO and CSTO could 
jointly guard the Tajik-Afghan border 
with Russia and Tajikistan, possibly 
also involving Iran 
 The Russia–NATO Council has become 
an important factor for stability and 
prediction of the relations with the 
Alliance 
 In the coming years Russia 
will produce new weapon 
systems which will 
qualitatively be at least equal 
or even better than those of 
other countries 
 Due to the demands of 
modern technology the 
strategy for the build- up of 
the armed forces must be 
reviewed to acquire an army 
which can cope with the most 
sophisticated demands 
 Such a modern army requires 
solving the current problems 
in prestige, salaries, social 
security and housing 
 
Source: Marcel de Haas: 2012, p. 25. 
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Appendix 2:  
 
Medvedev’s key security documents compared with those of Putin (2000-2009) 
National Security Concept 
January 2000 
Foreign Policy Concept 
June 2000 
Overview of Foreign Policy 
March 2007 
Strategy towards 2020 
February 2008 
Foreign Policy Concept 
July 2008 
National Security Strategy 
May 2009 
Russia in the world community 
 Dominance in the international 
community of developed Western 
states led by the United States 
This is especially aimed at 
applying unilateral solutions, 
including the use of military force, 
to key problems in world politics, 
flouting the fundamental 
principles of international law 
 Efforts to weaken Russia's 
position politically, economically 
and militarily, as well as in other 
fields 
 Attempts to ignore the interests of 
Russia in solving major problems 
in international relations 
 Terrorism poses a threat to world 
stability 
 Unilateral actions can 
destabilize the 
international situation, 
provoke tensions and the 
arms race, aggravate 
interstate contradictions, 
national and religious 
strife 
 The use of force in 
violation of the UN 
Charter is unlawful and 
poses a threat to the 
stability of the entire 
system of international 
relations 
 Attempts to introduce 
into international 
parlance such concepts 
as 'humanitarian 
intervention' and 'limited 
sovereignty' in order to 
justify unilateral power 
actions bypassing the 
UNSC are not acceptable 
 Russia has regained a 
balance of power and 
competitive international 
position lost after the 
Cold War 
 Force as a factor to solve 
international problems has 
increased 
 Focus on disarmament has 
dropped 
 Attempts to form a 
unipolar world 
 'Victory in the Cold War' 
results in unilateral 
responses  
 Continuous enlargement 
with new members is 
aimed at broadening 
Western influence  
 Iraq has demonstrated the 
myth of a unipolar world  
 The US withdrawal of the 
ABM Treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Under the pretext of 
liberty and open society 
the sovereignty of states 
and complete regions is 
destroyed 
 A fierce battle is taking 
place on energy 
resources Many armed 
conflicts carry the smell 
of oil and gas 
 There is a growing 
interest of the outside 
world in Russia and 
Central Asia because of 
their energy 
 Russia exerts a 
substantial influence 
upon the development of 
a new architecture of 
international relations  
 The reaction to the 
prospect of loss by the 
historic Western global 
monopoly is expressed in 
the policy of containing 
Russia 
 Unilateral action strategy 
destabilizes the 
international situation, 
provokes tensions and  
arms race, and 
exacerbates interstate 
differences 
 Strategic stability issue 
cannot anymore be 
addressed exclusively 
within the framework of 
Russia-US relations 
 RF energy potential provides 
opportunities to strengthen 
Moscow's influence in the 
international arena  
 Russia is on the way to becoming 
one of the leading powers in terms 
of technological progress, standards 
of living of the population and 
influence upon world processes  
 A new European security 
architecture should be formed, based 
upon an open system of collective 
security and a clear legal foundation 
 International politics will be aimed 
at acquiring energy resources from 
the Arctic and Caspian regions and 
from Central Asia  
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Russia’s national interests and priorities  
 Realizing Russia's national 
interests is possible only on the 
basis of stable economic 
development. That is why the 
national interests of Russia in 
this field are the crucial ones  
 Eliminating the causes and 
conditions contributing to 
political and religious 
extremism, ethno-separatism 
and their consequences, i e 
social, inter- ethnic and 
religious conflicts and 
terrorism 
 Strengthening Russia's 
position as a great power, as 
one of the centres of influence 
in a multipolar world  
 Developing mutually 
advantageous relations, 
especially with the member 
states of the CIS and Russia's 
traditional partners  
 Preventing military aggression 
against Russia and its allies  
 Developing relations with the 
members of the CIS, and 
developing integration 
processes within the CIS are in 
Russia's interest 
 Keep up a deterrence 
capability in the interest of 
preventing aggression on 
whatever scale, including 
when nuclear arms are used 
against Russia and its allies 
 To achieve firm and 
prestigious positions in the 
world community, most fully 
consistent with the interests of 
the RF as a great power, as one 
of the most influential centres 
of the modern world 
 A priority area in Russia's 
foreign policy is multilateral 
and bilateral cooperation with 
the member states of the CIS  
 A priority task is to strengthen 
the Union of Belarus and 
Russia as the highest, at this 
stage, form of integration of 
two sovereign states 
 Through the CIS Collective 
Security Treaty the 
development of cooperation in 
the military- political area and 
in the sphere of security 
 Relations with European states 
is Russia's traditional foreign 
policy priority 
 Of key importance are 
relations with the European 
Union (EU)  
 The intensity of cooperation 
with NATO will depend on its 
compliance with key clauses 
of the NATO-Russian 
Founding Act of 1997 
 Respect by Lithuania, Latvia 
and Estonia of Russian 
interests, including in the key 
question of respect for the 
rights of the Russian-speaking 
population (za rubezhem) 
 An important achievement of 
recent years is that Russia has 
reinstalled its foreign policy 
independence 
 Russia as an active global 
power not only participates in 
realizing the international 
agenda but also formulates this 
agenda  
 Energy diplomacy is gaining 
weight due to Russia's leading 
role in it 
 The energy factor is increasing 
in Russia's foreign policy  
 Relations with the CIS 
countries are a key priority in 
RF foreign policy 
 Russia has an interest in 
having friendly, flourishing, 
democratic and stable states at 
its borders  
 Russia does not intend to give 
up its natural competitive 
advantages nor to damage its 
national interests  
 Russia conducts an active 
policy towards the millions of 
ethnic Russians living in the 
near abroad (za rubezhem) 
Protection of their interests 
and encouragement to resettle 
in Russia are priorities of RF 
foreign policy 
 Russia should expand its 
current economic cooperation 
in the BRIC format (Brazil, 
Russia, India and China) with 
energy and counterterrorism 
 The expenditures for 
new weapon systems 
must be in line with 
the possibilities and 
not contrary to the 
priorities of the 
social-economic 
development 
 Strengthening of 
national security 
demands a new 
strategy towards 2020 
for the build-up of the 
armed forces 
 Russia has an active 
interest in global and 
regional integration 
processes 
 For the 
accomplishment of its 
national tasks Russia 
strives towards 
peaceful and positive 
stance of international 
relations 
 A new Russia, based on a 
solid foundation of its 
national interests, has now 
acquired a fully-fledged role 
in global affairs 
 Strengthening of the 
international position of 
Russia  
 RF possesses a real capacity 
to play a well-deserved role 
globally 
 Being the biggest European 
state,  
 Russia stands ready to play a 
constructive role in Europe 
Russia will make itself more 
fully engaged in its dialogue 
with its traditional partners, 
the Troika (Russia, India and 
China) and BRIC 
 The development of friendly 
relations with China and 
India forms an important 
track of Russia's foreign 
policy in Asia  
 Promote in every possible 
way the CSTO as a key 
instrument to maintain 
stability and ensure security 
in the CIS  
 Further strengthening of the 
SCO The OSCE should be a 
framework of supremacy of 
collective intergovernmental 
bodies' prerogatives  
 Create favourable conditions 
for establishing a Union 
State of Russia and Belarus 
 Russia is to become a 
global power, maintaining 
strategic stability and 
mutually advantageous 
partnerships in a multipolar 
world  
 The first priorities for 
Russia's national security 
are national defence as well 
as state and civil security 
 Subsequent priorities are a 
stable development of the 
quality of life, economic 
growth, science, 
technology, education, 
health care, culture, 
environment and strategic 
stability/equal partnership 
 Maintain parity with the 
USA on strategic nuclear 
weapons  
 There is interdependence 
of a stable development of 
the nation and its security 
Social-economic 
development is a priority 
on par with traditional 
areas of defence capability 
and national security 
 Russia will enhance mutual 
cooperation in multilateral 
formats such as G8, G20, 
CSTO, SCO, Russia-India-
China and BRIC 
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continued 
National Security Concept 
January 2000 
Foreign Policy Concept 
June 2000 
Overview of Foreign Policy 
March 2007 
Strategy towards 2020 
February 2008 
Foreign Policy Concept 
July 2008 
National Security Strategy 
May 2009 
Threats to Russia’s security 
 Attempts by separate states 
and intergovernmental 
organizations to belittle the 
role of existing mechanisms 
for the maintenance of 
international security, 
primarily the UN and the 
OSCE 
 The danger that the political, 
economic and military 
influence of Russia in the 
world will be reduced 
 The strengthening of military- 
political blocs and alliances, 
above all the expansion of 
NATO eastwards 
 The possible presence of 
foreign military bases and 
large military contingents in 
the immediate vicinity of 
Russian borders 
 The weakening of the 
processes of integration in the 
CIS 
 The development and 
escalation of conflicts close to 
the state border of the Russian 
Federation and the external 
borders of the member states 
of the CIS 
 International terrorism has 
unleashed an open campaign 
to destabilize the situation in 
Russia 
 NATO's practice of using 
 Growing trend towards a 
unipolar structure of the world 
with the economic and power 
domination of the United 
States  
 Stakes are being placed on 
Western institutions and 
forums of limited composition, 
and on weakening the role of 
the UNSC  
 Attempts to belittle the role of 
a sovereign state as the 
fundamental element of 
international relations generate 
a threat of arbitrary 
interference in internal affairs 
 NATO's present-day political 
and military guidelines do not 
coincide with Russian security 
interests and occasionally 
directly contradict them  
 This primarily concerns the 
provisions of NATO's new 
strategic concept, which do not 
exclude the use of force outside 
NATO's Treaty zone without 
the sanction of the UNSC  
 Russia retains its negative 
attitude towards the expansion 
of NATO 
 The protracted conflict in 
Afghanistan creates a real 
threat to security of the 
southern CIS borders and 
directly affects Russian 
 International terrorism  
 Extremism  
 Money laundering  
 Narcotics  
 Corruption  
 Regional conflicts  
 Independence of Kosovo 
would cause a serious 
deterioration of stability 
in Europe and would 
serve as a precedent  
 Georgia intends 
destroying the existing 
peacekeeping and 
negotiating formats 
complicating the 
situation around 
Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia  
 On Afghanistan, a failure 
and subsequent 
withdrawal of the USA 
and NATO would 
confront the Central 
Asian states and Russia 
with the Afghan threats 
of narcotics, terrorism, 
fundamentalism and 
destabilization  
 The USA and other 
Western states try to use 
the OSCE as an 
unilateral instrument for 
ensuring their foreign 
and security policy 
 A new arms race is 
unfolding, caused 
especially by 
developed states, 
leaning on their 
technological 
superiority  
 NATO refuses to sign 
the adapted CFE 
Treaty, but demands 
from Russia a one 
sided compliance  
 NATO further 
enlarges, taking its 
military infrastructure 
towards Russia's 
borders  
 The USA is 
establishing new 
military bases in 
Romania and Bulgaria 
and a missile defence 
shield in Poland and 
the Czech Republic 
 Because of the 
abundance in energy 
resources Russia is 
faced with a recidivist 
policy of deterrence 
resulting in unfair 
competition, as well 
as with actors that try 
to get hold of Russia's 
energy reserves 
 Coercive measures with the 
use of military force in 
circumvention of the UN 
Charter and UNSC 
undermines international law 
and enlarges conflict space, 
including the area around 
Russia 
 RF opposes unilateral actions 
in the field of strategic anti-
missile defence that are 
destabilizing international 
situation  
 Integration processes, 
including in the Euro-
Atlantic region, are often of a 
selective and restrictive 
nature  
 Russia maintains its negative 
attitude towards the 
expansion of NATO, notably 
to the plans of admitting 
Ukraine and Georgia to the 
membership in the alliance, 
as well as to bringing the 
NATO military infrastructure 
closer to the Russian borders 
on the whole 
 Attempts to lower the role of 
a sovereign state as a 
fundamental element of 
international relations  
 Military and political rivalry 
of regional powers  
 Terrorist and drug trafficking 
 The policy of a number of 
leading countries, aimed at 
military supremacy by 
building up especially 
nuclear but also conventional 
strategic arms, unilateral 
development of anti- ballistic 
missile defence and 
militarization of space, 
which may trigger a new 
arms race  
 NATO's expansion near 
Russia's borders and attempts 
to grant the military alliance 
a global role  
 The present Euro-Atlantic 
security architecture, which 
is only oriented at NATO  
 Non-compliance of 
international arms control, 
limitation and reduction 
agreements  
 Actions aimed at 
unbalancing the systems of 
state and military control, 
missile warning, outer space 
monitoring, the functioning 
of strategic nuclear forces, 
the nuclear armaments 
storage facilities, nuclear 
power plants and atomic and 
chemical industries and other 
potentially dangerous 
facilities  
 Competition for energy 
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military force outside the 
bloc's zone of responsibility 
without UNSC sanction, now 
elevated to the rank of a 
strategic doctrine, threatens to 
destabilize the entire global 
strategic situation 
 The under-funding of national 
defence leads to a critically 
low level of operational and 
combat training in the armed 
forces and other troops 
 Religious extremism and 
ethno- separatism 
 Linking of government organs 
with criminal organizations 
interests  
 The growth of separatism, 
ethnic-national and religious 
extremism 
 The growth of international 
terrorism, transnational 
organized crime, as well as 
illegal trafficking in drugs and 
weapons 
 The implementation of the 
plans of USA to create a 
national missile defence system 
will inevitably compel the RF 
to adopt adequate measures for 
maintaining its national 
security at a proper level 
objectives  
 NATO's refusal to sign 
the adapted CFE Treaty, 
further enlargement, 
possibly including 
Ukraine and Georgia, as 
well as the deployment 
of troops in Romania and 
Bulgaria deteriorate the 
relations with Russia 
 The planned US missile 
defence shield in Eastern 
Europe 
threats emanating from 
Afghanistan and prevention 
of risks of destabilization of 
the situations in Central Asia 
and Trans Caucasus 
  Spread of weapons of mass 
destruction and means of 
their delivery 
 Terrorism, separatism, ethno- 
national and religious 
extremism 
 Drug trafficking 
 Organized crime 
 Illegal migration 
 Infectious diseases 
 Regional conflicts 
 Demographic problems 
 Global poverty, including 
energypoverty 
 Climate change 
resources in key energy-rich 
regions creates tension which 
may escalate into the use of 
military force near the 
borders of Russia and its 
allies 
 Proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction 
 Terrorism, separatism, 
radicalism and extremism  
 Cyber crime, transnational 
organized crime (narcotics, 
illegal immigration), 
corruption  
 The international financial 
crisis  
 Epidemics and pandemics  
 Lack of fresh water 
      
Ensuring Russia’s security 
 Overcoming the RF's 
scientific, technical and 
technological dependence on 
external sources 
 Raising the military potential 
of the state and maintaining it 
at a sufficiently high level 
 Defending the legal rights 
and interests of Russian 
citizens resident abroad (za 
rubezhem) 
 All forces and facilities 
available, including nuclear 
weapons, will be used if 
necessary to repel armed 
aggression, if all other means 
have been exhausted 
 To protect the rights and 
interests of Russian citizens 
and compatriots abroad (za 
rubezhem) 
 To promote elimination of the 
existing and prevent the 
emergence of potential hotbeds 
of tension and conflicts in 
regions adjacent to the RF  
 Russia shall collaborate with 
other states in combating drug 
trafficking and organized crime  
 Partnership with all CIS 
member states to take into 
account in a due manner the 
interests of the RF, including 
guaranteeing rights of Russian 
 Multilateral diplomacy is 
the fundamental method of 
regulating international 
relations  
 The EU is Russia's 
principal partner in Europe  
 Russia expects two-way 
politics from European 
actors, such as the EU, the 
Council of Europe, the 
OSCE and NATO  
 The relationship with 
China and the cooperation 
in the triangle Russia-
India-China are vital 
policy points 
 Russia promotes 
 Russia is back in the 
international arena as 
a powerful state, 
which has to be taken 
into account and 
which can stand up 
for itself 
 In the coming years 
Russia will produce 
new weapon systems 
which will 
qualitatively be at 
least equal or even 
better than those of 
other countries  
 Due to the demands of 
modern technology 
 RF strengthens strategic 
partnership with leading 
producers of energy 
resources and dialogue with 
consuming countries and 
transit countries; assuming 
that reliability of energy 
supplies is supported by 
activities on ensuring 
stability of demand and 
secure transit 
  To protect rights and 
legitimate interests of the  
 Russian citizens and 
compatriots living abroad (za 
• rubezhëm) To consistently 
create conditions to assist in 
 The conditions of national 
security depend in the first 
place on the country's 
economic potential 
 Energy resources can be 
applied to support strategic 
deterrence  
 prominent task in 
strengthening national 
defence is modernization and 
restructuring of the armed 
forces and of the military 
industrial complex  
 Protection of Russian 
citizens in the 'near abroad' 
(za rubezhem)  
 To become the world's fifth 
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 One of the most important 
strategic objectives of 
military security is the 
interaction and cooperation 
with the member states of the 
CIS 
 The interests of Russia's 
national security may require 
a Russian military presence 
in certain strategically vital 
regions of the world 
 The stationing of limited 
military contingents (military 
bases, navy units) in these 
regions should ensure that 
Russia is ready to help 
establish a stable military- 
strategic balance of forces in 
the regions, and should 
enable the state to meet its 
foreign policy goals 
compatriots (za rubezhem) 
 Russia is prepared to consent 
with the USA to a further 
reduction of its nuclear 
potential  
 Russia shall seek preservation 
and observance of the 1972 
Treaty on the Limitation of 
Anti- 1 Ballistic Missile 
Systems (ABM) - the 
cornerstone of strategic 
stability 
 Russia intends to further 
promote the strengthening of 
regional stability by 
participating in the processes of 
reducing and limiting 
conventional armed forces 
international peace 
through the UN and 
regional organizations 
such as OSCE, CSTO, 
CIS and SCO  
 CSTO and SCO can play a 
positive role in the fight 
against narcotics and 
terror and in promoting 
stabilization around 
Afghanistan and in Central 
Asia as a whole 
 Russia repeatedly offers 
NATO to cooperate with 
the CSTO around 
Afghanistan NATO and 
CSTO could jointly guard 
the Tajik-Afghan border 
with Russia and 
Tajikistan, possibly also 
involving Iran 
 The Russia-NATO 
Council has become an 
important factor for 
stability and prediction of 
the relations with the 
Alliance 
the strategy for the 
build-up of the armed 
forces must be 
reviewed to acquire an 
army which can cope 
with the most 
sophisticated demands  
 Such a modern army 
requires solving the 
current problems in 
prestige, salaries, 
social security and 
housing 
the voluntary resettlement to 
the RF of compatriots Russia 
together with CSTO, SCO 
and others makes consistent 
efforts to prevent export of 
terrorism and drugs from 
Afghanistan 
 Regional collective security 
and cooperation ensuring the 
unity of the Euro-Atlantic 
region, in such a way as not 
to allow its new 
fragmentation and 
reproduction of bloc-based 
approaches which still persist 
in the European architecture 
dating from the Cold War 
 RF is prepared to negotiate a 
reduction of strategic 
offensive weapons to a level 
sufficient to maintain 
strategic stability 
largest economy in terms of 
GDP  
 Maintaining nuclear parity 
with the USA in reply to its 
European missile shield and 
the US nuclear strike 
doctrine 
 A gradual development 
towards a world without 
nuclear weapons  
 Deployment of military 
contingents in conflict areas 
promoting strategic stability 
and equal strategic 
partnership 
      
 National Security Concept 2000 (SCRF 2000a); Foreign Policy Concept 2000 (SCRF 2000c); Overview of Foreign Policy 2007 (MID 2007a); Strategy 2020 (Kremlin 2008a); Foreign Policy 
Concept 2008 (MID 2008); National Security Strategy 2009 (SCRF 2009b) 
 
Source: Marcel de Haas: 2012, p. 98. 
